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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  An explosion in the amount and discovery of electronically stored 
information (ESI) threatens to clog the federal court system and make 
judicial determination of the substantive merits of disputes an endangered 
species.1  It is interesting that this information discovery explosion has 
                                                 
*
 Doug Rogers is a 1971 graduate of Yale Law School and a partner in the Columbus 
office of Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, L.L.P.  He is a member of the firm’s 
Litigation Group, its ESI Core Team, and its Technology and Intellectual Property 
Group.  He is the author of a number of articles on electronic discovery, copyright, 
trademark, and antitrust law.  The views expressed in this article are his own. 
1
 Ross Chaffin, The Growth of Cost-Shifting in Response to the Rising Cost and 
Importance of Computerized Data in Litigation, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 115, 154 (2006) 
(“Often, a court’s decision regarding the allocation of costs in this very expensive 
discovery will induce settlement, and thus determine the outcome of the litigation 
itself.”); Mia Mazza, Emmalena K. Quesada & Ashley L. Sternberg, In pursuit of FRCP 
1: Creative Approaches to Cutting and Shifting Costs of Discovery of Electronically 
Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, ¶ 3 (2007) (stating “the explosive growth 
of ESI has changed the very nature of discovery, with new electronic complexities 
making the preservation and production of evidence far more challenging.”); George L. 
Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation:  Can the Legal System Adapt?, 13 RICH. 
J.L. TECH. 10, ¶ 2 (2007) (stating “it is no exaggeration to say that litigation, as we have 
known it, is threatened by information’s new hyper-flow.”); Martin H. Redish, Electronic 
Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 605 (2001) (stating “it is clear 
that the existing discovery structure threatens core values of the litigation matrix.”); Lee 
H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic Discovery After December 1, 2006, 116 
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skipped over Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provides in part that the federal rules “shall be construed and administered 
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action.”2   
 
[2]  Clients know, or after first becoming involved in litigation learn, that 
federal court litigation is rarely speedy or inexpensive.  However, the 
amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically addressing this 
explosion in the discovery of ESI (the “ESI Rules”) became effective on 
December 1, 2006.3  Do the ESI Rules help? 
 
[3]  This article addresses that question by reviewing many of the federal 
court decisions on the ESI Rules4 and proposing general principles to help 
make the discovery aspect of litigation more manageable, without harming 
the due process rights of the litigants.5  Specifically, this article analyzes 
issues chronologically from the view of an attorney or client facing 
litigation:  
                                                                                                                         
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167, 191 (Nov. 30, 2006) (Lawyers and judges are collectively 
wringing their hands over the continuing decline in the number of trials, especially jury 
trials.  The factors that contribute to this are many and varied, but there is a consensus 
that the costs and delays of civil litigation - largely due to discovery - play a significant 
role.)  
2
 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (2007).  See also Mazza, supra note 1, at 176 ([L]itigants should be 
aggressive in invoking FRCP 1 as a basis for the innovative use of search strategies and 
cost-shifting to increase efficiency and reduce costs across the board in discovery.  It is 
only in this way that the mandate of a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action will become a reality in discovery.).  
3
  Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 167 (stating “[o]n December 1 [2006], amendments will go 
into effect to make the discovery rules better able to accommodate the vast changes in 
information technology that have already occurred and that will inevitably continue.”). 
4
 There have been a number of decisions since December 1, 2006 addressing the issue of 
whether the inadvertent production of ESI constituted a waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege or the attorney work product doctrine.  See, e.g. In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 
501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 791 (E.D. La. 2007); Pinnacle Pizza Co. v. Little Caesar Enters., 
No. CIV. 04-4170, 2007 WL 1960585, at *1 (D.S.D. July 3, 2007); Corvello v. New 
England Gas Co., 243 F.R.D. 28, 28 (D.R.I. 2007); Amersham Biosciences Corp. v. 
PerkinElmer, Inc., No. 03-4901 (JLL), 2007 WL 329290, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2007).  
These issues are beyond the scope of this article. 
5
  Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 465 (2000) (stating that “[t]he Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure are designed to further the due process of law that the Constitution 
guarantees.”). 
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Part II addresses steps a company facing litigation may 
have to address to satisfy the legal requirement of 
preserving relevant ESI; 
 
Part III shows that Rule 26(b)(2)(C) allows a court to 
restrict production of ESI when the marginal utility of that 
ESI seems small, even though that ESI contains relevant 
and accessible information; 
 
Part IV addresses the difficult issue of the production of 
information that is periodically changing, such as metadata, 
databases and information on RAM; and   
 
Part V argues that “good cause” under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) for 
the production of not reasonably accessible ESI generally 
should require a showing that there have been discrepancies 
in the production or preservation of accessible 
documents/ESI.6 
 
[4]  This article concludes that clients and their attorneys take risks in 
making unilateral decisions on many of these issues, rather than disclosing 
their decisions early to the court and opposing counsel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The term used in Rule 26(b)(2)(B) is “electronically stored information from sources 
that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”  
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).  This article sometimes uses the phrase “inaccessible format” 
as a shorthand for the longer phrase used in Rule 26(b)(2)(B).  
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II.  TO SUSPEND OR NOT TO SUSPEND COMPUTER DOCUMENT 
DESTRUCTION PRACTICES 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[5]  The general duty to preserve documents and ESI7 arises not from any 
specific federal rule, but from federal case law.8  The contours of the duty 
to preserve are extremely difficult to determine.9  The general statement 
about the duty to preserve is that when litigation is reasonably likely, a 
company has an obligation to preserve documents and ESI relevant to both 
the anticipated claims and defenses, but there are at least three separate 
elements to the duty to preserve.10  One is when the duty to preserve 
                                                 
7
   The Advisory Committee Notes (“Committee Notes”) to the ESI Rules state that 
although “documents” generally include ESI, ESI is in many ways distinct from other 
documents:   
[I]t has become increasingly difficult to say that all forms of 
electronically stored information, many dynamic in nature, fit within 
the traditional concept of a ‘document.’ 
 . . . At the same time, a Rule 34 request for production of ‘documents’ 
should be understood to encompass, and the response should include, 
electronically stored information unless discovery in the action has 
clearly distinguished between electronically stored information and 
“documents.” 
234 F.R.D. 219 (2006).  Advisory Committee Notes are instructive in determining the 
intent of Congress in the rules, but they do not have the force of law.  McKnight v. 
Purdue Pharma Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 756, 758 (E.D. Tex. 2006). 
8
 Thomas Y. Allman, Managing Preservation Obligations After the 2006 Federal E-
Discovery Amendments, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, ¶ 1 (2007).  Of course, various statutes 
require certain companies to preserve certain documents and ESI.  In addition, to the 
extent a party violates a court order for the production of evidence, the court has authority 
both under Rule 37(b) and its inherent power to sanction the non-producing party.  See 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that 
“[t]he authority to sanction litigants for spoliation arises jointly under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and the court’s own inherent powers. . . . The duty to preserve 
attached at the time that litigation was reasonably anticipated.”). 
9
  Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information:  The December 2006 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 13 (2006) 
(stating “[p]erhaps the most vexing issues in electronic discovery, and the issues that grab 
the most headlines, are the issue of data preservation and its flip side, spoliation.”).   
10
 See Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 216-18; see also The Sedona Conference Commentary on 
Legal Holds, The Trigger & the Process (Aug. 2007 Public Cmt. Version), available at 
www.thesedonaconference.org.   
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 3 
 
5 
commences.11  A second is to determine how far beyond the physical 
boundaries of the company, if at all, the duty to preserve documents within 
                                                 
11
 See, e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding 
that no sanction for spoliation occurred); Kronisch v. U.S., 150 F.3d 112, 126-27 (2d Cir. 
1998) (holding that reason for destruction – such as fear of litigation – can show there 
was obligation to preserve); Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., No. 3:04-CV-1976 (JCH), 2007 
WL 2066497, at *3 (D. Conn. July 16, 2007) (stating that the defendant had a duty to 
preserve based on a meeting among certain employees regarding the incident that showed 
defendant “was aware of Doe’s allegations of sexual assault by MASI,” even before 
counsel sent a demand letter); Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. 
C 03-5340 JF (RS), 2007 WL 1848665, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2007) (stating that duty 
to preserve documents arose at time of cease and desist letter); Cache La Poudre Feeds, 
Inc. v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 623 (D. Col. 2007) (holding that pre-suit 
demand letter from counsel for company B concerning possible trademark infringement 
by company A did not trigger obligation to preserve, because letter (1) did not threaten 
litigation, and (2) discussed resolving the matter); PML N. Am., LLC v. Hartford 
Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 05-CV-70404-DT, 2006 WL 3759914, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 
20, 2006) (holding that statement of adverse party that it rejected change to insurance 
agreement, that threatened legal action for fraud, gave rise to duty to preserve); In re 
Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (stating that 
litigation against company does not, by itself, create obligation to preserve documents 
regarding possible litigation against shareholder of company); In re Quintus Corp., 353 
B.R. 77, 84 (D. Del. 2006) (holding that the party should have anticipated litigation over 
its failure to comply with asset purchase agreement, since it destroyed books and records 
at a time it had not paid all the liabilities it had assumed); Kemper Mortgage, Inc. v. 
Russell, No. 3:06-cv-042, 2006 WL 2319858, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2006) (adopting 
Zubulake that duty to preserve “was triggered when defendant learned that plaintiff was 
likely to sue, well before she filed a discrimination charge” with the EEOC); Broccoli v. 
Echostar Commc’n Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 510-511 (D. Md. 2005) (linking duty to 
preserve to “notice of potential litigation” and verbal complaints to supervisors); 
Rutgerswerke AG v. Abex Corp., No. 93 CIV .2914 JFK, 2002 WL 1203836, at *13 
(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2002) (discussing steps by the prospective plaintiff to collect certain 
evidence on the advice of its own counsel, triggering the duty to preserve more 
documents); Sanchez v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 0494 LMM, 1999 WL 
639703, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1999) (stating that steps the prospective plaintiff took 
in preparation of litigation upon the advice of counsel, triggered obligation to preserve, or 
at least to notify the third party who held the allegedly defective product); Lamarca v. 
United States, 31 F. Supp. 2d 110, 127 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that death of a patient 
created duty to preserve records pertaining to the patient, even before the patient’s estate 
complained about death); AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 441-42 
(2007) (stating that duty to preserve arose, before suit filed, when the plaintiff wrote letter 
asking for equitable adjustment to contract price, not on earlier letter from the plaintiff 
alleging differing note conditions at work location). 
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its possession, custody or control extends.12  Once there is a duty to 
preserve and the locations of the documents/ESI to consider for 
preservation are identified, the third is to determine what to preserve.13 
                                                 
12
 Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal 
of the lawsuit in a products liability action because the defendant failed to preserve the 
automobile he was driving, even though it was owned by someone else).  
If a party cannot fulfill this duty to preserve because he does not own or 
control the evidence, he still has an obligation to give the opposing 
party notice of access to the evidence or of the possible destruction of 
the evidence if the party anticipates litigation involving that evidence. 
Id.  See World Courier v. Barone, No. C 06-3072 TEH, 2007 WL 1119196, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 16, 2007) (holding unspecified adverse inference for destruction of hard drive 
by the husband of the defendant in case alleging the defendant misappropriated trade 
secrets of the plaintiff); In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 195-96 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (stating that company had duty to preserve documents at overseas company that 
resulted from reorganization of original company into two companies); A. Farber & 
Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 189 (C.D. Cal.. 2006) (affirming that documents 
are within a party’s possession, custody, or control for purposes of Rule 34 production if 
it has the legal right to obtain the documents on demand). 
13
 See, e.g., School-Links Techs., Inc. v. Applied Res., Inc., No. 05-2088-JWL, 2007 WL 
708213, at *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 28, 2007) (stating that there is a duty to preserve and provide 
an opportunity for inspection to a potentially responsible party before destruction); 
Phillips v. Netblue, Inc., No. C-05-4401 SC, 2007 WL 174459, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
22, 2007) (holding that the plaintiff did not have obligation to preserve images obtained 
by clicking on links embedded in e-mails he was required to preserve); In Re Napster, 
Inc. Copyright Litig.,  562 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (stating that “Hummer had a continuing 
duty to preserve documents after the Katz lawsuit was dismissed in July 2001.”); Del 
Campo v. Kennedy, No. C-01-21151 JW (PVT), 2006 WL 2586633, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 8, 2006) (ordering Defendant to maintain voice mails beyond scheduled retention 
period); Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Alcoa, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 335, 345 (M.D. La. 2006) 
(stating that “Alcoa was not required to preserve every shred of paper but only those 
documents of which it had ‘actual knowledge’ that they would be material to future 
claims.”); Kemper Mortgage, 2006 WL 2319858, at *2 (holding that one must preserve 
what it knows or reasonably should have known is reasonably likely to be requested 
during discovery and must not destroy unique evidence helpful to adversary); Concord 
Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, at *7 (E.D. Ark. 
Aug. 29, 1997) (rejecting argument that because the defendant was involved in antitrust 
matters from 1992 to 1997, it was under a duty to preserve all e-mails relevant to antitrust 
issues from that date on, and concluded it “would simply be inappropriate to give an 
adverse inference instruction based upon speculation that deleted emails would be 
unfavorable to Defendants’ case.”); see also THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES 
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT 
PRODUCTION 32 Cmt. 5.d. (2d ed. June 2007) (stating that “[i]t must be recognized that in 
some circumstances, a legal hold notice may be unnecessary (e.g., the relevant 
information is already secured). . . .”) [hereinafter Sedona Principles]. 
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[6]  One reason the duty to preserve ESI is important is that if a party 
violates its duty to preserve, the court can impose significant sanctions.14  
These can include monetary sanctions, a prohibition against that party 
questioning witnesses on certain issues, an instruction to the jury that it 
can find the party destroyed the ESI because the ESI was harmful to that 
party on specified issues (an adverse inference instruction), a finding by 
the court that certain issues are deemed to have been established against 
                                                 
14
 The federal courts have decided many cases since December 1, 2006 on the sources of 
authority to sanction parties and counsel for destruction of ESI and other discovery 
abuses.  See, e.g., Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 2007 WL 1189451 (8th Cir. 2007); 
Google, Inc., 2007 WL 1848665, at *1; In re Sept. 11th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, 243 
FRD 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Miller v. Holzmann, No. 951231 (RCL), 2007 WL 781841 
(D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2007); Floeter v. City of Orlando, No. 6:05-cv-400-Orl-22KRS, 2007 
WL 486633 (M.D. Fla. 2007); Padgett v. City of Monte Sereno, 2007 WL 878575 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007); Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 2006 WL 3538935 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2006); United 
Med. Supply Co. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257 (2007); Tri-State Armored Servs., Inc. 
v. Subranni, 366 B.R. 326 (D.N.J. 2007).  Although the standard can vary among 
jurisdictions:  
Generally, a party claiming spoliation of evidence must show the 
following elements: (1) that the party had an obligation to preserve the 
electronic evidence at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the electronic 
evidence was destroyed with a culpable state of mind (may include 
ordinary negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, willful, or 
intentional); and (3) the destroyed evidence was relevant and favorable 
to the party's claim such that a reasonable trier of fact could find it 
would support that claim.  
In re Krause, 367 B.R. 740, 766-67 (D. Kan. 2007).  Some courts say that if there is 
evidence that the party facing sanctions destroyed the ESI willfully or in bad faith, that is 
sufficient to satisfy the third point.  Id. at 767;  see also Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic 
Res. Corp., No. 05 Civ. 4837, 2006 WL 1409413 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  But see, e.g., 
Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2005); Morris v. Union Pacific 
R.R., 373 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 2004); Stevenson v. Union Pacific R.R., 354 F.3d 739 (8th 
Cir. 2004); Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 
2002); Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929 (11th Cir. 1997); Optowave v. Nikitin, No. 6:05-
cv-1083-Orl-22DAB, 2006 WL 3231422 (M.D.Fla. 2006); Mosaid Techs., Inc. v. 
Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D. N.J. 2004).  This article analyzes steps 
to consider to avoid sanctions, not the authority of courts to impose, and the standards 
for, sanctions.  But see In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006); Consol. Aluminum Corp., 244 F.R.D. at 335; Concord Boat Corp., 1997 WL 
33352759, at *1.  There is disagreement over what constitutes a culpable state of mind, 
and courts sometimes apply different standards, depending on the sanctions in question 
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the sanctioned party, and even a judgment on liability against the 
sanctioned party.15 
 
[7]  This article considers any guidelines that exist to help companies 
determine - once the duty to preserve has arisen - which policies/practices 
that result in the “automatic”16 deletion or change by computer of ESI they 
must suspend.17  In other words, what ESI must a company preserve?  For 
instance, a document retention policy of a company may provide for the 
destruction of all e-mails within 90 days after being received.  Although 
perhaps not thought of as document destruction policies, another example 
of an automatic deletion/change practice is the change in a company’s 
database of orders, shipments, and receipts, in which the dollar amount of 
total orders will change automatically each time the company records a 
new order.18   
                                                 
15
 See, e.g., Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 
66932 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (finding attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of 
$8,568,633.24); J. P. Morgan Chase Bank v. Neovi, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-0095, 2007 WL 
1989752 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (precluding the defendant from contesting one dispositive 
legal issue); Doe, 2007 WL 2066497, at *8 (holding adverse inference); World Courier, 
2007 WL 1119196, at *3 (holding adverse inference); Teague v. Target Corp., No. 
3:06CV191, 2007 WL 1041191, at *2 (W.D. N.C. 2007) (holding adverse inference); 
Claredi Corp. v. Seebeyond Techs. Corp., No. 4:04CV1304 RWS, 2007 WL 735018, at 
*4 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (monetary); May v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, No. 2:05-cv-918, 2006 
WL 3827511 (S.D Ohio Dec. 28, 2006) (holding unspecified, except attorneys’ fees);  
PML N. Am., LLC, 2006 WL 3759914, at *9 (entering a default judgment); Wachtel, 239 
F.R.D. at 115 (deeming certain facts admitted); Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., LLC, 
No. 05 C 3003, 2006 WL 1308629 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2006) (entering a default judgment 
on certain counterclaims); United Med. Supply Co., 77 Fed. Cl. at 276 (2007) (prohibiting 
the sanctioned party from questioning witness). 
16
 It is automatic based on the instructions previously provided to the computer. 
17
 The same question arises for document policies of a company imposing certain volume 
limits on an employee’s e-mail, such as after 1 gigabyte, the employee cannot save any 
additional e-mail.  See Allman, supra note 8, at 58. 
18
 “Dynamic databases, for example, are . . . constantly changing as data are added or 
modified. . . . More generally, computer systems routinely supersede and replace data, 
and most also discard data according to some directions installed with them.”  Richard L. 
Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond:  Toward Brave New World or 1984?, 236 F.R.D. 598, 
610, 615.  See also Allman, supra note 8, at ¶ 7 (“[R]outine business processes are often 
designed to free up storage space for other uses without any intent to impede the 
preservation of potential evidence for use in discover.  Interruption of those routine 
processes is notoriously difficult to implement in a consistent fashion.”). 
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[8]  Must a company suspend these policies/practices when litigation is 
likely?  The next section looks at what the cases under the new ESI rules 
have said on this issue. 
 
B.  PRESERVATION CASES UNDER THE NEW ESI RULES 
 
[9]  The ESI Rules now provide a “limited safe harbor”19 for preservation 
decisions in Rule 37(e):20  “Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may 
not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide 
electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith 
operation of an electronic information system.”21  Thomas Allman 
correctly noted – even before many of the decisions discussed next – that 
                                                 
19
 See Allman, supra note 8, at ¶ 33; see also Philip J. Favro, A New Frontier in 
Electronic Discovery: Preserving and Obtaining Metadata, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 
*20 (2007).  Cf. Ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 05-CV-329-GKF-SAJ, 
2007 WL 149873, *6 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (“The Court further advises the parties that they 
should be very cautious in relying upon any ‘safe harbor’ doctrine as described in new 
Rule 37(f).”). 
20
 On December 1, 2007, what had been Rule 37(f) became Rule 37(e).  See FED. R. CIV. 
P. 37, see also Electronic Discovery and Evidence: Newly Revised Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Proceedings Effective December 1st, 2007, available at 
http://arkfeld.blogs.com/ede/2007/12/newly-revised-f.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2008).  In 
discussing court decisions issued prior to December 1, 2007, this article refers to Rule 
37(f).  Otherwise, this article refers to Rule 37(e). 
21
 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).  It is significant that Rule 37(e) does not relate only to formal 
document retention programs but to all changes in information due to the “operation of an 
electronic information system.”  The Committee Notes explain:  
Examples of this feature in present systems includes programs that 
recycle storage media kept for brief periods against the possibility of a 
disaster that broadly affects computer operations; automatic 
overwriting of information that has been ‘deleted’; programs that 
change metadata (automatically created identifying information about 
the history or management of an electronic file) to reflect the latest 
access to particular electronically stored information; and programs that 
automatically discard information that has not been accessed within a 
defined period or that exist beyond a defined period without an 
affirmative effort to store it for a longer period.  Similarly, many 
database programs automatically create, discard, or update information 
without specific direction from, or awareness of, users.   
Advisory Committee notes, 234 F.R.D. at 370.  Rule 37(e) does not purport to address a 
court’s inherent authority to impose sanctions for destruction of documents.  See Allman, 
supra note 8, at ¶ ¶ 10, 35; Judge S. A. Scheindlin, Address, Moore’s Federal Practice - 
E-Discovery:  The Newly Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (2006), at 27.  
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the “cases are far from uniform on the need to routinely interrupt the 
recycling of existing backup media.”22  However, keeping in mind that 
Rule 37(e) “reflects the fact that in the world of electronic information it is 
simply not fair to assume that a loss of ESI necessarily equates to intent to 
destroy evidence,”23 certain principles arise from the following cases. 
 
1.  KEY EMPLOYEES 
 
[10]  In In re NTL, Inc. Securities Litigation, the court granted an adverse 
inference instruction as the result of the destruction of the e-mails of forty-
four key employees24.  Magistrate Judge Peck said, “[o]nce a party 
reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document 
retention/destruction policy and put in place a ‘litigation hold’ to ensure 
the preservation of relevant documents.”25  However, the magistrate judge 
also indicated in his decision that the obligation to preserve documents 
applied only to key employees of the defendant, such as “directors, 
officers, managers and the employees in charge of financial decision 
making.”26 
 
[11]  Determining the key players was also an important issue in deciding 
the parameters of the scope of the duty to suspend document destruction 
policies in Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc.27  The 
                                                 
22
 Allman, supra note 8, at ¶ 42.  
23
 Id. at ¶ 34.  In addition, “[i]nterruption of those routine processes is notoriously 
difficult to implement in a consistent fashion.”  Id. at ¶ 7.  See also id. at ¶ 35. 
24
 In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179 (2007). 
25
 Id. at 193 (quoting Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003)).  In Zubulake, the court also said that “the duty to preserve extends to those 
employees likely to have relevant information - the ‘key players’ in the case.”  Zubulake, 
220 F.R.D. at 218.   
26
 In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. at 194.   The court applied this obligation to 
affiliates in other countries and said that where more severe sanctions were issue, the 
moving party must show that the lost information would be favorable to it.  Id. at 199 
(quoting Chan v. Triple 8 Palace, Inc., 2005 WL 1925579, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 
2005)).  However, it also stated that when a party destroyed evidence in bad faith, that 
faith alone was circumstantial evidence from which a fact finder could conclude the 
evidence was unfavorable to the destroying party.  Id. at 199 (quoting  Residential 
Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2002)).  
27
 Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 
2007). The court in Cache took a limited view of when the obligation to preserve was 
triggered.  It said that “while a party should not be permitted to destroy potential evidence 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 3 
 
11 
court said that counsel for the defendants in this trademark infringement 
action was required to undertake a reasonable investigation of “employees 
who played a significant or decision-making role.”28  The court concluded 
that the fact Land O’Lakes – after the duty to preserve had arisen – 
continued its document retention practice of expunging the hard drives of 
former key employees in the development and implementation of the 
brand violated the defendant’s obligation to preserve ESI in the case.29  
 
[12]  Magistrate Judge Facciola discussed the obligation to turn off 
automatic delete features in Peskoff v. Faber.30  He at first appeared to 
state an absolute, inflexible legal rule when he said that “[t]he Advisory 
Committee comments to amended Rule 37(f) make it clear that any 
automatic deletion feature should be turned off and a litigation hold 
imposed once litigation can be reasonably anticipated.”31    However, he 
then used more flexible language when he concluded:  
 
Faber’s not turning the automatic deletion feature off once 
informed of pending litigation may serve as a premise for 
additional judicial action, including a sanction, without 
offending amended Rule 37(f).  It is a legitimate exercise of 
discretion to require Faber to participate in a process to 
ascertain whether a forensic examination can yield e-mails 
that were deleted after February 6, 2004, because at that 
                                                                                                                         
after receiving unequivocal notice of impending litigation, the duty to preserve relevant 
documents should require more than a mere possibility of litigation.”  Id. at 621.  Since 
the letter from counsel “implied that a client preferred and was willing to explore and 
negotiate a resolution,” the court concluded that this letter did not create an obligation to 
preserve.  Id. at 622. 
28
 Id. at 629 (emphasis added).  The court said it was not inclined to penalize a party for 
failing to approach former employees in an effort to respond to “catch all” or “nearly 
indecipherable requests for production.  Id. at 627. 
29
 Id. at 629.  The court also said that “once a litigation hold has been established, a party 
cannot continue a routine procedure that effectively ensures that potentially relevant and 
readily available information is no longer ‘reasonably accessible’ under Rule 
26(b)(2)(B).” Id.  It also added that Land O’Lakes’ general counsel and its retained 
counsel had “failed in many respects to discharge their obligation to coordinate and 
oversee discovery.” Id. at 630.  The court, however, only imposed a monetary sanction of 
$5,000. 
30
 Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54 (D.D.C. 2007).  
31
 Id. at 60. 
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time, Faber could reasonably anticipate that Peskoff would 
sue him.32   
 
It seems likely the court meant that once litigation became reasonably 
likely, a failure to suspend automatic deletion features of a document 
destruction program would put the burden on that party if a challenge to 
the destruction arose in the litigation.   
 
[13]  After all, in the report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge 
Facciola in Miller v. Holzmann,33 with which District Judge Lambreth 
agreed,34 the magistrate judge said the hold memo needed to be sent to 
“only those reasonably likely to maintain documents relevant to the 
litigation or investigation.”35  This statement implicitly recognizes that 
some relevant documents held by non-key employees may be deleted 
without adverse consequences to the company, or otherwise the litigation 
hold notice would have to be sent to more employees. 
 
2.  LIKELY SOURCES OF RELEVANT ESI 
 
[14]  Key employees should know what documents/ESI they create or 
modify, but they may not know where the company stores the relevant 
ESI.  This imposes responsibility on not just the key employees, but IT 
personnel in a company.  Moreover, key employees probably have created 
a lot of ESI of no relevance to a dispute.  The cases have not adopted a 
uniform standard on how certain a company must be that some source 
contains relevant ESI in order to have to preserve that source. 
  
[15]  In Escobar v. City of Houston, the court indicated that under Rule 
37(f), a company can continue to operate a document destruction program 
                                                 
32
 Id.  (emphasis added).  As a result, the court ordered counsel for the parties to 
collaborate on a request for proposals to conduct a forensic examination of the hard 
drives of the applicable computers.  Id. at 66. 
33
 Miller v. Holzmann, No. 95-01231 (RCL/JMF), 2007 WL 172327 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 
2007).  Miller was a government contracting case, in which a copy of the response to a 
FOIA request involving allegations of fraud in previous years had been made.  That copy 
was later destroyed as part of the authorized record destruction schedule of the National 
Archives Administration Act.  Id. at *4-5. 
34
  Id. at *1. 
35
 Id. at *6 (emphasis added). 
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after a duty to preserve arises, unless the company knows, or reasonably 
should know, that responsive documents would be destroyed by such 
program. 36  Specifically, the court ruled that the “threshold issue is 
whether and when the City knew or should have know[sic] that electronic 
communications exchanged the day after a police shooting in November of 
2003 were likely to contain information about that shooting.”37  The court 
concluded: 
 
The record shows that the officers involved in the shooting 
were not likely to have used e-mail to communicate about 
the event in the day after it occurred.  The plaintiffs do not 
point to specific evidence in the record demonstrating that 
the City knew that information relevant to the shooting was 
being destroyed because of the feature of the computer 
system’s routine operation that e-mails were destroyed after 
ninety days.38   
 
The court added the City had demonstrated that “when it anticipated that 
information or records would likely be relevant to the shooting, such 
information and records were preserved.”39  The court therefore denied 
sanctions. 
                                                 
36
 Escobar v. City of Houston, No. 04-1945, 2007 WL 2900581, at *18 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 
29, 2007). 
37
 Id. at *18 (emphasis added).  The plaintiffs stated that they had provided notice to the 
City of their claim within 60 days after the shooting and that the Houston Police 
Department’s electronic communications in the 24 hours after the shooting were likely to 
discuss events that occurred after the shooting of the individual involved.  The City, in 
turn, argued that it had preserved material it believed were relevant, including the 
homicide file containing relevant video and audio files, the internal affairs investigation 
filed and the record of the 911 calls.  Id. at *17. 
38
 Id. at *19. 
39
 Id.  Referring to the records of the 911 calls and the internal investigation into the 
shooting., the court held that since the plaintiffs had not made a showing that the City’s 
destruction of electronic communications was done in bad faith, and since there was no 
evidence the information destroyed was relevant, it could not impose the sanctions the 
plaintiff sought—an adverse inference.  Id. at *18.  The court did not discuss the 
possibility of imposing milder sanctions.  However, since the court appeared to conclude 
the City had operated in good faith, presumably the court could not have imposed milder 
sanctions under Rule 37(f).  Milder sanctions under the court’s inherent power would 
have been a possibility, but such a ruling would leave Rule 37(e) as a “safe harbor” in 
which ships might not want to dock. 
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[16]  Similarly, in Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., the court concluded that the duty 
to preserve required the party to preserve what she knows or reasonably 
should know is relevant in the action. 40  The court added that although “the 
scope of the duty to preserve evidence is not boundless, at a minimum an 
opportunity for inspection should be afforded a potentially responsible 
party before relevant evidence is destroyed.”41 
 
[17]  On the other hand, the district court in In re K-Mart Corp.42 indicated 
the requesting party must prove actual knowledge of the likely destruction 
of relevant ESI in order for the court to impose sanctions for spoliation of 
evidence.43  Under the company’s document retention policy, e-mails in 
inboxes were deleted 90 days after the date sent, e-mails in sent folders 
were deleted 30 days after the date sent, e-mails in the deleted items folder 
were deleted when the user shut down her computer, and e-mails in user 
defined folders were deleted 180 days after the date sent.44  The court 
found that K-Mart did not put a litigation hold in place, and said that 
“while the failure to implement a litigation hold does not necessarily give 
rise to sanctions for spoliation of evidence, it is at least ‘relevant’ to the 
spoliation inquiry.”45  The court concluded, however, that “Global has 
failed to establish that K-Mart knew there was relevant, discoverable 
information among the documents being destroyed pursuant to the 
company’s pre-existing document retention/destruction policy.  Indeed, as 
discussed further below, it is not entirely clear that such information was, 
in fact, destroyed.”46  The court declined to sanction K-Mart for spoliation 
at that time.47   
                                                 
40
  Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., No. 06-CV-2488-KHV, 2007 WL 3231431, at *4 (D. Kan. 
Oct. 30, 2007) (“A litigant has a duty to preserve evidence that it knows or should know 
is relevant to imminent or ongoing litigation”) (citing Workman v. AB Electrolux Corp., 
2005 WL 1896246, at *5 (D. Kan. Aug. 8, 2005)). 
41
 Id. at *4 (citing Workman v. AB Electrolux Corp., 2005 WL 1896246, *6 (D. Kan. 
Aug. 8, 2005) (emphasis added)).  The court also mentioned that “preservation may not 
be ‘selective,’ saving only the evidence supporting the theory of liability and impeding 
the examination of another theory.”   
42
 In re K-Mart Corp., 371 B.R. 823 (Bankr. N.D. Ill., 2007). 
43
 Id. at 849. 
44
 Id.  
45
 Id. at 847. 
46
 Id. at 848-49 (emphasis added).   
47
 Id. at 855.  The court did award Global’s attorneys fees and costs.  The court did not 
expressly discuss Rule 37(f) in the opinion.  The court did order the defendant, “to the 
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3.  AVAILABILITY FROM OTHER SOURCES 
 
[18]  Whether there are alternate sources available for the same ESI can be 
an important consideration for some courts in determining the scope of the 
duty to preserve.  In Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade,48  an Archway truck 
rear-ended a Greyhound bus, and litigation ensued.49  Ten days after the 
accident, Greyhound removed the electronic control module that stored 
certain information concerning speed, starts, stops, and the times and types 
of mechanical failures that could befall a bus.50  The electronic control 
module (ECM) indicated that failure in a speed-sensor had caused the 
slow speed of the bus.51  Greyhound had sent the electronic control 
module to the engine manufacturer, who erased the information before the 
case was filed.52  Archway moved for sanctions against Greyhound for 
spoliation, but the district court denied the motion and the court of appeals 
affirmed.53  The Eighth Circuit said that “although some material was not 
preserved, the ECM data identified the specific mechanical defect that 
slowed the bus, and several bus passengers testified about how the bus 
acted before the collision.”54  In other words, lack of prejudice – because 
the necessary information was otherwise available – was important to the 
Eighth Circuit.55   
 
                                                                                                                         
extent it has not already done so, [to] perform a systematic search of all documents on its 
P-drive and W-drive and produce them to counsel for Global. . . .”  Id.  The e-mails could 
not be stored on either the P-drive or W-drive, and it appeared this part of the decision 
was a response to testimony at the hearing by a witness (not listed on the pretrial 
statement) about the P-drive and W-drive.  Id. at 833.  
48
 Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2007). 
49
 Id.  
50
 Id. at 1034.  
51
 Id.  
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. at 1035. 
54
 Id.. 
55
  In Wingnut Films, Ltd. v. Katja Motion Pictures Corp., the court sanctioned 
defendant’s document destruction policy “or otherwise take adequate steps to preserve 
documents.”  Wingnut Films, Ltd. v. Katja Motion Pictures Corp., No. CV05-15160-
RSWL SHX, 2007 WL 2758571, *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007).  This language suggests 
that if the documents had been available from another source, the court would not have 
sanctioned the defendant for its failure to suspend an automatic deletion policy for certain 
ESI. 
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[19]  The court seemed to take a different view in Miller.56  The 
government argued that “most, if not all, of the documents that the 
magistrate found to be lost and irretrievable were likely given to the 
defendants over the course of discovery.”57  The court said that even if that 
were true, the government’s conduct created a situation where the court 
could not assess whether information had been lost and how important that 
information was.58  The court concluded that even without proof of 
prejudice, the government’s failure to act to preserve the documents 
constituted sanctionable negligence.59 
 
4.  WHAT IS ROUTINE OPERATION? 
 
[20]  Courts have appeared skeptical of claims of routine operation 
defenses under Rule 37(e).  For instance, in Doe v. Norwalk Community 
College, the court granted an adverse inference instruction based on the 
defendant’s spoliation of evidence in a case in which the plaintiff alleged 
violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.60  The 
defendants argued that it was a normal practice at Norwalk Community 
College to scrub the hard drives of employees who had left college 
employment.61  The court said that Rule 37(f) “appears to require a routine 
system in order to take advantage of the good faith exception, and the 
court cannot find that the defendants had such a system in place.”62 
 
[21]  The court in Doe also said that “in order to take advantage of the 
good faith exception, a party needs to act affirmatively to prevent the 
system from destroying or altering information, even if such destruction 
                                                 
56
 Ex rel. Miller v. Holzmann, No. 95-1231 (RCL), 2007 WL 781941 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 
2007). 
57
 Id. at *1. 
58
 Id.  How can one party prove relevant e-mails were destroyed by a document retention 
program?  One typical way is for the requesting party to produce from some other source 
an e-mail that should have been produced by the producing party.  It might then be 
logical to infer that other relevant e-mails had been deleted and the requesting party 
harmed as a result. 
59
 Id.  The court agreed with the magistrate judge’s earlier decision in the case to wait 
until after trial to fashion an appropriate sanction. 
60
 Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., No. 3:04-CV-1976 (JCH), 2007 WL 2066497 (D. Conn. 
July16, 2007). 
61
 Id. at *4. 
62
 Id.  
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would occur in the regular course of business.”63  This sentence suggests 
that if a party allows its routine document retention policy to destroy any 
relevant documents, the party cannot take advantage of the good faith 
exception in 37(f).  However, if only irrelevant documents were destroyed 
under a document destruction policy, there should be no sanctions, even 
without 37(f).  If 37(f) provides a party any protection, it consequently 
means a routine document destruction policy may destroy some relevant 
documents without sanction.   
 
[22]  The court in Doe relied on the Advisory Committee Notes to the ESI 
Rules:  “When a party is under a duty to preserve information because of 
pending or reasonably anticipated litigation, intervention in the routine 
operation of an information system is one aspect of what is often called a 
‘litigation hold.’”64  However, an earlier sentence in the Committee Notes 
states, “[g]ood faith in the routine operation of an information system may 
involve a party’s intervention to modify or suspend certain features of that 
routine operation to prevent the loss of information, if that information is 
subject to a preservation obligation.”65  The Committee Notes do not 
contemplate that a document retention policy must necessarily be 
suspended, or the Committee would not have used “may.”66   
 
[23]  The defendants in Doe argued that they had no choice but to continue 
the routine deletion of the backup server, because otherwise, they would 
have had to reveal the identity of the “Jane Doe plaintiff” in sending out 
                                                 
63
 Id. 
64
 Id. at *4 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f), Advisory Comm.’s Notes to 2006) (emphasis 
added). 
65
  FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f), Advisory Comm.’s Notes to 2006.  
66
 Of course, if a company has retention polices (some companies apparently have no 
such policies) involving periodic deletion of ESI, or volume limits on ESI, presumably 
the application of some retention polices or volume limits will have to be suspended, 
unless perhaps the dispute involves events occurring before the company had ESI.  The 
Committee Notes say, “[i]t is unrealistic to expect parties to stop such routine operation 
of their computer systems as soon as they anticipate litigation.  It is also undesirable; the 
result would be even greater accumulation of duplicative and irrelevant data that must be 
reviewed, making discovery more expensive and time-consuming.”  234 F.R.D. 219.  
However, the Committee Notes also admit, “[t]here is considerable uncertainty as to 
whether a party – particularly a party that produces large amounts of information – 
nonetheless has to interrupt the operation of the electronic information systems it is using 
. . . .”  Id. 
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the litigation hold notice.  The court rejected that argument, saying that 
“the defendants could at least have conferred with Doe’s counsel 
regarding this question of how to send a system-wide communication on 
document retention without revealing Doe’s real name,” or it could have 
instructed IT employees “to cease the deletion or scrubbing of electronic 
data.”67  The court did not address whether it would have been 
burdensome for the defendant to preserve the data. 
 
[24]  A court also rejected the “routine operation” defense in In re Krause, 
which involved the debtor’s use of GhostSurf on his computers.68  The 
court ordered Krause to turn over the hard drives of his computers to the 
trustee, but Krause installed and ran GhostSurf on his computers 
immediately prior to turning over the hard drives, resulting in the deletion 
of files.69  Krause argued that the two hard drives on his computer had 
crashed in 2006, that he had been using GhostSurf prior to 2006 “to 
protect his computers from viruses and worms that he feared would infect 
them because of his extensive use of the internet in his work,”70 and that 
he re-installed and operated Ghost Surf after his computers had crashed.71  
                                                 
67
 Doe, 2007 WL 2066497, at *4 n.9. (emphasis added). 
68
 In re Krause, 367 B.R. 740, 767 (D. Kan. 2007).  The court said:  
GhostSurf is designed to wipe or eradicate data and files as part of its 
protective and security functions. GhostSurf wipes files that may be 
infected with viruses and worms. It can also be set to purge or wipe 
‘deleted files’ in such a way that the data is actually overwritten, 
precluding the ability to recover or restore the files and data. Both 
experts agreed that when a user “deletes” files from a hard drive, the 
data remains intact. The act of deletion merely eliminates the “pointer” 
that allows the computer to locate the data on the hard drive. By using 
data recovery software, that data may be extracted (as, indeed, some 
has been in this case). An additional step is necessary to eradicate this 
data entirely. GhostSurf performs this function by overwriting the file 
with a new file that contains no bytes of data . . . .”   
Id. at 749-50.  The court also said that GhostSurf included an application, Tracks Cleaner, 
that “tracks and cleans files in all applications . . . . The user can select which ‘elements – 
browsers, email programs, Office applications, etc. – to wipe.”  Id. at 752.  In other 
words, it appears that GhostSurf can erase the remnants of deleted files and can also 
eliminate active files. 
69
  Id. at 749. 
70
  Id.  
71
  Id.  
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The court said there was “no credible evidence” to support that claim.72  In 
other words, the operation of GhostSurf had not been routine, since 
Krause had used GhostSurf promptly after installation and immediately 
prior to turning his hard drives over to the trustee.73 
 
[25]  The court in Krause found that even after the duty to preserve had 
arisen, Krause “generally deleted e-mails once they were no longer 
relevant to his ongoing enterprises,”74 and he allowed the Tracks Cleaner 
application in GhostSurf to wipe other relevant files.75  The court entered a 
partial default judgment against Krause.76  
 
[26]  The court in Krause made a statement that might suggest a general 
obligation to preserve inaccessible data, such as deleted files, in addition 
to accessible data.  For instance, it said, “[o]nce the duty to preserve 
attached, Krause was required to suspend his routine document destruction 
practices, be it the deletion of e-mails or the operation of wiping software 
to prevent recovery of the electronic evidence,” citing Zubulake.77  
However, the court in Zubulake expressly rejected normally requiring a 
party to preserve inaccessible ESI as follows:  “As a general rule, that 
litigation hold does not apply to inaccessible backup tapes (e.g., those 
typically maintained solely for the purpose of disaster recovery), which 
may continue to be recycled on the schedule set forth in the company’s 
policy.”78 
 
[27]  The court in Krause, in fact, expressly recognized that the debtor had 
not necessarily been under an obligation to preserve “every e-mail or 
electronic document he generated or existed on his hard drive.”79  Quoting 
Zubulake, the court said Krause was “under a duty to preserve what [he] 
                                                 
72
  Id.  
73
  “[A] litigant has an obligation to suspend features of a computer’s operation that are 
not routine if those features will result in destroying evidence.”  Id. at 768.  The court 
also said it was crucial that Krause had purged “his electronic data and files immediately 
prior to turning over his computers and after learning that the Court was ordering their 
production.”  Id. 
74
 Id. at 753. 
75
  Id.  
76
  Id. at 777.   
77
  Id. at 766.   
78
  Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
79
 In re Krause, 367 B.R. at 766.  
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knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is reasonably 
likely to be requested during discovery and/or is the subject of a pending 
discovery request.”80 
 
[28]  A key in Krause is that after the duty to preserve had arisen, Krause 
“continued his routine practice of deleting e-mails.”81  Upon such 
deletions, the only evidence of those e-mails would be in the inaccessible 
parts of the computer.  As a result, Krause had the obligation not to erase 
the inaccessible parts of his computer, because that was the only source in 
which the trustee could recover the deleted e-mails.  This is consistent 
with other cases in 2007, discussed next, holding that deletion of 
accessible ESI after the duty to preserve has attached provides good cause 
to search ESI in inaccessible formats.   
 
5.  FAILURE TO PRESERVE ACCESSIBLE ESI 
 
[29]  The fact that the defendant’s auto-delete practices allowed 
responsive information to be deleted from accessible storage provided 
good cause to order the search of inaccessible storage media in Disability 
Rights Counsel of Greater Washington v. Washington Metropolitan 
Transit Authority.82  The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, which prohibits discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities.83  Although the complaint had been filed on March 25, 
2004, the defendant acknowledged that until at least June of 2006 it had 
done nothing to stop its e-mail system from obliterating all e-mails after 
60 days, as a result of the automatic delete feature of its computer 
system.84  The court ordered the defendants to search backup tapes that 
                                                 
80
  Id. at 766. 
81
  Id. 
82
  Disability Rights Council v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 139 (D.D.C. 
2007).  The plaintiff in Disability Rights Counsel was not seeking sanctions, but simply 
asking that the defendant be required to search the backup tapes for discoverable 
information deleted by the document retention policy.  The court considered the 
balancing factors listed in Rule 26(b)(2)(B) and 26(b)(2)(C) and concluded that “these 
factors make for an overwhelming case for production of the backup tapes.”  Id. at 148. 
83
 Id. at 141. 
84
 Id. at 145. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 3 
 
21 
they held.85  The court said that the good faith requirement of Rule 37(f) 
meant that “a party is not permitted to exploit the routine operation of an 
information system to thwart discovery obligations by allowing that 
operation to continue in order to destroy specific stored information that it 
is required to preserve.”86 
 
[30]  In Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., a different district court ordered the 
plaintiff in an employment discrimination action to produce for inspection 
her hard drive to determine if e-mails had been deleted.87   The 
communications in questions were e-mails with the plaintiff’s husband 
about what she thought was happening at the corporate defendant and e-
mails with the defendant’s paralegals.88  The court said that “if the emails 
have been deleted, she shall produce for inspection her computer hard 
drive from which the deleted emails were sent.  This will allow defendants 
to use the services of a computer forensics specialist, if necessary, to 
retrieve them.”89 
 
[31]  Benton is evidence that sometimes, individual sentences in many 
decisions concerning the discovery of ESI should not be considered 
separately.  For instance, the court in Benton stated that “[o]nce the duty to 
preserve documents attached, [the party] was required to suspend her 
routine document destruction practices, including the deletion of e-
mails.”90  That suggests an absolute duty to suspend document destruction 
policies.  However, the court also said, “Once a party reasonably 
anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document 
retention/destruction policy and put in place a litigation hold to ensure the 
preservation of relevant documents.”91  In other words, the second 
sentence suggests a party to litigation does not have to totally suspend 
routine document destruction practices, but instead, must put in place 
practices only to preserve relevant documents.   
                                                 
85
 Id. at 146 (discussing the e-mails of three employees that had been retained, because 
those three individuals archived all of their e-mails after 60 days).   
86
 Id. 
87
 Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., No. 06-CV-2488-KHV, 2007 WL 3231431, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 
30, 2007). 
88
 Id.  
89
 Id. (explaining that the expert was limited to reviewing specific relevant e-mails). 
90
 Id. at *4. 
91
 Id. (emphasis added). 
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6.  DATABASES AND OTHER CHANGING DATA 
 
[32]  If databases or other data compilations are the source of relevant 
information, a party cannot delete that database or data compilation once 
the duty to preserve has attached.92  The more difficult issue is what does a 
party do with a database that may change every day in the regular course 
of its business?  The Sedona Principles indicate that generally, courts 
should not compel the preservation of “particularly transitory” ESI, but 
recognize that in certain circumstances a court may order such 
preservation.93   
 
[33]  This statement does not suggest that a company must take a snapshot 
of the database at a particular point in time, but it does not preclude such 
possibility.  In Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty 
Corp., the court rejected the argument of the defendant that the plaintiff 
had to restore to a searchable format, a relevant database it had 
downgraded to an unsearchable format. 94  The court observed that Best 
Buy did not destroy the information but removed it from a searchable 
format.  However, “[a]bsent specific discovery requests or additional facts 
suggesting that the database was of particular relevance to this litigation, 
the court determines that Best Buy did not have an obligation to maintain 
the Odom database at a monthly cost of over $27,000.”95  The court also 
said that “Best Buy  …. need not restore the information to searchable 
format unless defendants establish good cause.”96  However, the court 
noted that the defendants had not argued the requested materials were 
uniquely available from the database and said, “[i]n the absence of 
particularized arguments, the court cannot conclude that defendants have 
established the good cause required to restore” the database.97 
 
                                                 
92
 See Sedona Principles, supra note 13 (“Organizations must properly preserve 
electronically stored information that can reasonably be anticipated to be relevant to 
litigation.”).  
93
 Id. at 33. 
96 
 Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp. No. 05-2310 (DSD/JJG), 
2007 WL     423086, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 2007). 
95
 Id at *3. 
96
 Id. 
97
 Id. at *4. 
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[34]  Similar questions may arise with metadata that can change every 
time a party revises a document.  If in fact, a business is in the process of 
revising a document, must it preserve a picture of each draft of the 
document?  In Wyeth v. Impax Laboratories, Inc., the court denied a 
motion to compel the production of metadata, at least for the time being, 
but added, “the producing party must preserve the integrity of the 
electronic documents it produces.” 98  This does not state, however, 
whether the party had to preserve metadata without change, or simply had 
to preserve the metadata in whatever form it existed as the document 
changed.  The Sedona Principles suggest:  
 
If such overwriting [presumably either in databases or 
metadata] is incidental to the operation of the systems – as 
opposed to a deliberate attempt to destroy evidence in 
anticipation of or in connection with an investigation or 
litigation – it should generally be permitted to continue . . . 
unless the overwriting destroys potentially discoverable 
electronic information that is not available from other 
sources.99 
 
7.  ESI CREATED IN THE FUTURE 
 
[35]  When the litigation involves not just claims for which past ESI are 
relevant, but claims for which ESI created after the commencement of the 
litigation will be relevant, the courts have not provided much guidance.  
                                                 
98
 Wyeth v. Impax Labs., Inc., No. 06-222-JJF, 2006 WL 3091331, at *2 (D. Del. 2006).  
See further discussion infra Part IV.A.3. 
99
 See Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 28. Comment 12a to Sedona Principles 12 
provides:  
The extent to which metadata should be preserved and produced in a 
particular case will depend on the needs of the case.  Parties and 
counsel should consider:  (a) what metadata is ordinarily maintained; 
(b) the potential relevance of the metadata to the dispute . . . and (c) the 
importance of reasonably accessible metadata to facilitating the parties’ 
review, production, and use of the information.  In assessing 
preservation, it should be noted that the failure to preserve and produce 
metadata may deprive the producing party of the opportunity later to 
contest the authenticity of the document if that metadata is material to 
that determination.  
Id., at 61 
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For instance, in Turner v. Resort Condominiums Int’l, the court denied a 
motion for sanctions for the defendant’s failure to comply with a demand 
“for an indefinite time not modify or delete any electronic data in any 
mainframe, desktop, or laptop computers or other storage or media devices 
. . . .”
 100
  Turner was a suit alleging pregnancy/sex discrimination.  
Although decided in July 2006, the court discussed Rule 37(f), saying that 
the “proposed Rule 37(f) recognizes that discovery should not prevent 
continued routine operation of computer systems.”101  The court observed 
that “the pre-suit letter did not accommodate the routine day-to-day needs 
of a business with a complex computer network and demanded actions by 
RCI that went well beyond its legal obligation on the 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 
and under its more general duty to avoid deliberate destruction of 
evidence.”102  The court concluded that “[t]here is no evidence of any bad 
faith alteration or destruction of evidence, and plaintiff has been given 
ample opportunity to discover such evidence.”103 
 
[36]  In Wingnut Films, Ltd. v. Katja Motion Pictures Corp., the court 
sanctioned the defendant for its failure to suspend the automatic deletion 
of electronic documents, including documents created after the 
commencement of the litigation. 104  The dispute was over the plaintiff’s 
right to an accounting of royalties from the defendant’s sale and licensing 
of various documents related to Lord of The Rings.105  Addressing not only 
ESI created before the dispute arose, but also after the litigation had 
commenced, the court said that the litigation concerned the accounting 
“from the film’s release through to the present.  New Line’s continued 
purging of e-mails during the pendency of this litigation therefore cannot 
be excused.”106  As in Turner, the court in Wingnut did not indicate how 
                                                 
100
 Turner v. Resort Condos. Int’l, No. 1:03-CV-2025-DFH-WTL, 2006 WL 1990379, at 
*6 (S.D. Ind. July 13, 2006). 
101
 Id. at *6 n.2 (emphasis added). 
102
 Id. at *6 (emphasis added). 
103
 Id. at *8.  It is not clear whether there had been an automatic delete feature working on 
the defendant’s computer systems, or simply the active use of computer systems and 
databases by which the information contained in the systems/databases necessarily 
changes. 
104
 Wingnut Films, Ltd. v. Katja Motion Pictures Corp., No. CV 05-1516-RSWL SHX, 
2007 WL 2758571, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2007). 
105
 Id. at *2.  
106
 Id. (emphasis in original).  The court had issued an order requiring the defendant to 
produce all “damages-related documents for all accounting periods through the date of 
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the defendant or a forensic expert should implement an ongoing document 
preservation program for newly created ESI. But, since the subject of 
damages was focused, it is logical that the preservation of such ESI would 
be easier to accommodate than if a plaintiff is claiming an ongoing 
conspiracy of some nature and wants the defendant to preserve all 
documents relevant to those continuing claims and defenses.    
 
C.  PRINCIPLES 
 
[37]  It is clear that a party must not destroy documents it knows, or 
should know, are likely to be relevant to reasonably expected litigation.107  
However, the majority of cases show that automatic suspension of all 
automatic deletion practices would be an over-reaction.108  Similarly, the 
Sedona Principles state that “it is unreasonable to expect parties to take 
every conceivable step to preserve all potentially relevant electronically 
stored information.”109    
 
[38]  For instance, a party should not have to preserve all possible sources 
of e-mail simply because it is possible that an existing or former 
employee, who claims she was harassed, may have forwarded an e-mail 
from her supervisor to other employees, or because one of the e-mails may 
                                                                                                                         
trial.”  Id. at *2 n.1.   The court concluded that the defendant “should be required to retain 
an outside vendor experience in electronic document retrieval to collect responsive 
documents” from servers and hard drives of specified employees.  Id. at *17. 
107
 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
108
 Focusing on individual sentences in court decisions could lead one to argue that a 
party must preserve everything.  For instance, in Zubulake, Judge Scheindlin said, “[a] 
party or anticipated party must retain all relevant documents (but not multiple identical 
copies) in existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches, and any relevant documents 
created thereafter.”  220 F.R.D. at 218.  However, in the same decision, Judge Scheindlin 
recognized practical limits to this general statement:  “Must a corporation, upon 
recognizing the threat of litigation, preserve every shred of paper, every e-mail or 
electronic document, and every backup tape?  The answer is clearly, ‘no.’” Id. at 217.  
See also Scheindlin, supra note 21, at 7-8 (rejecting the idea that “every scrap of ESI that 
could possibly contain relevant information” must be saved and stating that “a balance 
must be struck between meeting the obligations imposed by litigation and continuing to 
function as a business.  The answer is that it is impossible to save everything, but a good 
faith effort must be made to save relevant evidence.”). 
109
 Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 28. 
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have been exported into a .pst file110 outside of the e-mail folders in the 
cache111 of a computer.112  Comment 5a to Sedona Principle 5 explains:  
 
The obligation to preserve relevant evidence is generally 
understood to require that the producing party make 
reasonable and good faith efforts to identify and manage 
the information that  it has identified as reasonably likely to 
be relevant.  Satisfying this obligation must be balanced 
against the right of a party to continue to manage its 
                                                 
110
 Pst (abbreviated from Personal Storage Table) files (files with *.pst extension) are 
files used by Microsoft Outlook to store some certain data.  Such files can be exported 
from Microsoft Outlook and stored on an individual computer’s hard drive outside the 
Outlook environment.  See SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (May 2005), available at 
http://www.sedonaconference.org/ [hereinafter Sedona Glossary]; Microsoft Outlook 
Backup, available at http://www.outlookbackup.com/pst-file.html (last visited Jan. 1, 
2008). 
111
 Cache is “[a] dedicated, high speed storage location which can be used for the 
temporary storage of frequently used data.  As data may be retrieved more quickly from 
cache than the original storage location, cache allows applications to run more quickly.  
Web site contents often reside in cached storage locations on a hard drive.”  See Sedona 
Glossary, supra note 110, at 7. 
112
 Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 38 (“Responding parties are best situated to 
evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies appropriate for preserving and 
producing their own electronically stored information.”).  Comment 6a explains, 
“[t]ypically, the producing party identifies and informs the key individuals likely to have 
relevant information of the specific need to preserve all available relevant information – 
this instruction is sometimes referred to as a ‘litigation hold notice.’”  Id.  There is no 
automatic need to go beyond the key individuals and the IT personnel who would know 
where the company keeps the ESI of those key individuals.  Of course, to the extent a 
company has notice that relevant documents exist beyond those held by key individuals, 
the obligation to preserve can expand.  For instance, it presumably would not protect a 
company that has issued and enforced a litigation hold to key employees, but otherwise 
let document destruction continue, if the Comptroller of the company, who might not 
normally be expected to be a key employee about personnel matters, knew she had a 
damaging e-mail in his e-mail inbox and let the document retention policy destroy that e-
mail after 60 days.  Alternatively, it could be argued that any employee whose knowledge 
of events could be attributed to the company should be deemed a key employee.  A 
company should consider two separate “types” of knowledge: actual knowledge of the 
location of relevant documents and constructive knowledge.  A litigation hold should 
cover sources where it is known relevant documents exist and those sources where it 
reasonably can be anticipated that relevant documents exist that are not available 
elsewhere. 
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electronic information in the best interest of the enterprise, 
even though some electronic information is necessarily 
overwritten on a routine basis by various computer 
systems.113 
 
[39]  On the other hand, to the extent the company knows certain relevant 
ESI is contained only in a source for which the applicable document 
retention policy will delete that ESI in the foreseeable future, the company 
must suspend that policy retaining the ESI.  Even if a company does not 
know of specific relevant files contained in ESI, Escobar and Benton show 
that if the company reasonably should know that relevant files are likely to 
exist in ESI that do not exist elsewhere in the company in an accessible 
format, the company should suspend the document retention policy for 
that source and retain that ESI.114  This includes the preservation of 
metadata for such files.  To allow document retention policies to destroy 
the ESI in either situation (actual or constructive knowledge that the e-
mails are relevant and not otherwise available) probably would not 
constitute the good faith operation of a document retention policy.  It 
would, in effect, be using a document retention policy with the intent to 
remove relevant evidence.115 
 
[40]  Ignorance of the ESI is no excuse.  As Judge Scheindlin said in 
Zubulake, “[c]ounsel must become fully familiar with her client’s 
document retention policies, as well as the client’s data retention 
architecture.”116  Judge Rosenthal has said, “[e]lectronic discovery imposes 
                                                 
113
 Id.; see also Steven C. Bennett, E-Discovery by Keyword Search, 15 No. 3 PRAC. 
LITIGATOR 7 10-11 (Am. Law Ins. 2004). 
A company need not preserve every scrap of paper in its files . . . . In 
the electronic context, similarly, the standard for a search is 
reasonableness. . . .  When the relevant electronic documents are 
confined in scope, they may be preserved in their entirety.  When the 
records are vast (such as a company’s entire e-mail system, a keyword 
search may be employed. 
Id. at 11. 
114
 See supra text accompanying notes 36-41. 
115
 “The good faith concept permits inquiry into whether a system was arranged to 
remove embarrassing information, and also into whether the party took suitable 
measures—sometimes called a ‘litigation hold’- to curtail discarding of information when 
the prospect of litigation arose.”  Marcus, supra note  18, at 615. 
116
  Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 229 F.R.D. at 432. 
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new requirements on lawyers and litigants to learn large amounts of 
information about their own and their adversary’s information systems, 
early in the case.”117  Parties and their counsel must make thoughtful 
preservation decisions, no matter how difficult.   
 
1.  KEY EMPLOYEES 
 
[41]  An important step in document preservation is determining who the 
key employees are, based on the reasonably anticipated claims and 
defenses of the parties or anticipated parties.  As the commentary to the 
Sedona Principles states, “[t]ypically, the producing party identifies and 
informs the key individuals likely to have relevant information of the 
specific need to preserve all available relevant information . . . .”118  This 
commentary is consistent with the cases decided in 2007 on ESI focusing 
on key employees as the base for determining the scope of a document 
hold.119  Those key employees are likely to include IT personnel, who 
probably can best identify the servers and other media containing ESI 
(perhaps once the business personnel describe the relevant ESI they 
created for the applicable businesses at issue).  
 
[42]  Identification of key employees, however, does not mean that the 
company must preserve every file that may contain any ESI created by 
that key employee.  For instance, in Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. 
Harding, Early, Follmer & Frailey, the court refused to impose sanctions 
on the defendants for failure to preserve cache files in its computers that 
the plaintiffs claimed contained infringing copies of the plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted works that the defendant had copied from the Web.120  The 
                                                 
117
  Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 177; see also Allman, supra note 8, at 20-23. 
118
 See Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 38.  Sedona Principle 6 states, “[r]esponding 
parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies 
appropriate for preserving and producing their own electronic data and documents.”  Id. 
119
 See supra notes 24-29, 33-35 and accompanying text. 
120
 Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding, Early, Follmer & Frailey 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 
640 (E.D. Pa. 2007).  
A cache file is a temporary storage area where frequently accessed data 
can be stored for rapid access. When a computer accesses a web page, 
it will sometimes store a copy of the web page in its cache in case the 
page is needed again  . . . . When the Harding firm viewed archived 
screenshots of Healthcare Advocates’ website through the Wayback 
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court said, “[t]o impose a sanction on the Harding firm for not preserving 
temporary files that were not requested, and might have been lost the 
second another website was visited, does not seem to be a proper situation 
for an adverse spoliation inference.”121  Although the plaintiff apparently 
only requested an adverse inference, the court’s ruling hopefully would 
have been the same for any request for sanctions. 
 
 
2.  ALTERNATE SOURCES FOR THE SAME ESI 
 
[43]  Whether there are alternate sources for the same relevant documents 
can also be an important consideration that addresses prejudice and the 
need for sanctions.122  If there are alternate sources for the same 
documents, there should be no need to preserve a duplicate set.  However, 
a judgment to allow automatic deletion because there are alternate sources 
will often raise problems, including proving the alternate sources and 
convincing the court that the availability of alternate sources is a 
defense.123 
 
3.  TIME PERIODS FOR SUSPENSION 
 
[44]  If the litigation involves events only occurring in the past, then an 
important task is determining for what time periods a party should retain 
documents.  In Apsley v. Boeing Co., the magistrate judge rejected the 
request for “background information” and concluded that “a reasonable 
period of time for discovery extends back to January 1, 2002, the earliest 
                                                                                                                         
Machine, copies of the screenshots may have been automatically stored 
in the cache files of the Harding firm’s computers. 
Id. at 640.   
121
 Id. at 642. 
122
 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
123
 Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 45.  Comment 8a to the Sedona Principles states: 
The mere suspicion that a source may contain potentially relevant 
information is not sufficient to demand the preservation of that source 
‘just in case.’  Rather, the appropriate standard should be to preserve 
information on and search sources where the producing party is 
reasonably likely to locate potentially relevant information not 
available from other available, searched sources.   
Id. 
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date of Boeing’s alleged scheme.” 124  Moreover, when past events are the 
focus of litigation, documents generated after the basic events at issue may 
be irrelevant.125 
 
4.  INACCESSIBLE ESI 
 
[45]  For ESI in inaccessible format, including back-up tapes, there should 
be no obligation to preserve, unless the party in question has some notice 
that there is a need to preserve the inaccessible ESI.  This conclusion is 
consistent with Sedona Principle 9, which provides, “[a]bsent a showing 
of a special need and relevance, a responding party should not be required 
to preserve, review, or produce deleted, shadowed, fragmented, or residual 
electronically stored information.”126   
 
[46]  On the other hand, that conclusion is subject to the requirement in 
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) that “[a] party need not provide discovery of 
electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as 
not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”  Presumably, 
if a party has not notified the other side that it is allowing inaccessible ESI 
with potentially relevant information to be destroyed, if that ESI is 
destroyed, then the party allowing the destruction may be subject to 
sanctions for spoliation if the opposing party complains once it learns of 
the destruction.127  If the opposing party is notified of the pending 
                                                 
124
  Apsley v. Boeing Co., No. 05-1368-MLB, 2007 WL 163201, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 18, 
2007); see also Hayes v. Compass Group USA, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 363, 366 (D. Conn. 
2001) (stating that the “[d]efendants will not be required to manually search their files for 
complaints filed prior to January 1, 1998.”). 
125
 See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 212 F.R.D. 33, 35 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating that “it is unlikely 
that people, working in an office, generate data about an event that is not 
contemporaneous unless they have been charged with the responsibility to investigate 
that event or to create some form of history about it.”) 
126
 Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 49.  Furthermore, Sedona Principle 11 says, “a 
responding party may satisfy its good faith obligation to preserve and produce relevant 
electronically stored information by using electronic tools and processes, such as data 
sampling, searching, or the use of selection criteria, to identify data reasonably likely to 
contain relevant information.”  Id. at 57. 
127
 Allman, supra note 8, at 26 (stating that “absent agreement with opposing counsel, 
unilateral preservation decisions about inaccessible sources always carry some risk of 
post-production challenge for potential spoliation.”).  
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destruction and does not object, the party destroying the documents would 
appear to have a good argument on waiver.128 
 
5.  RISK OF UNILATERAL DECISIONS 
 
[47]  In light of the different views courts have expressed over the scope 
of the duty to preserve, the relatively safe practice for a party, who has an 
obligation to preserve, is to quickly and conscientiously determine what 
reasonable preservation steps it will take and then notify the other party of 
its conclusions.  If the other party objects, then the court should resolve 
the issue, and there will not be a dispute months or years later after the 
destruction of the ESI. 
 
[48]  This is consistent with Sedona Principle 3 about the duty to preserve: 
“Parties should confer early in discovery regarding the preservation and 
production of electronically stored information when these matters are at 
issue in the litigation and seek to agree on the scope of each party’s rights 
and responsibilities.”129  This is also consistent with the statement in 
Benton in connection with the duty to preserve that “at a minimum an 
opportunity for inspection should be afforded a potentially responsible 
party before relevant evidence is destroyed.”130  This is consistent with the 
statement in Doe v. Norwalk Community College that “the defendants 
                                                 
128
 Adoption and Amendments to Civil Rules, 234 F.R.D. 219 (2006).   
A party’s identification of sources of electronically stored information 
as not reasonably accessible does not relieve the party of its common-
law or statutory duties to preserve evidence.  Whether a responding 
party is required to preserve unsearched sources of potentially 
responsive information that it believes are not reasonably accessible 
depends on the circumstances of each case.  It is often useful for the 
parties to discuss this issue early in discovery. 
 Id.  Cf. Marketfare Annunciation, LLC v. United Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., No. 06-
07232, 2007 WL 3273440 (E.D. La. Nov. 5, 2007). 
The Plaintiffs filed this motion for sanctions on September 18, 2007, on 
the eve of the discovery deadline. . . .  Given that trial is imminent and 
that discovery has closed, the Court in its discretion declines to address 
the merits of the Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions because doing so at 
this juncture would be in direct contravention of the Scheduling Order. 
 Id. at *3-4. 
129
 Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 21. 
130
 Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., No. 06-CV-2488-KHV, 2007 WL 3231431, at *4 (D. Kan. 
Oct. 30, 2007) (emphasis added). 
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could at least have conferred with Doe’s counsel regarding this question 
of how to send a system-wide communication on document retention 
without revealing Doe’s real name.” 131   
 
[49]  For instance, the Best Buy decision suggests that as a general matter, 
a party with a database does not have to take a snapshot of that database 
periodically to fulfill its duty to preserve, and may even be able to change 
the format of the database.  However, the court in Best Buy cautioned that 
there had been no particularized request for information, so the decision 
may have limited effect.132  In Turner, the court recognized that requests 
for documents created after the duty to preserve attaches can create 
additional burdens on the party receiving the request, but did not propose a 
solution.  A similar issue arises with metadata that continually or 
periodically changes over time as the document changes.133   
 
[50]  Generally, the stronger argument would appear to be that a party 
cannot delete the database or metadata, but can allow changes in databases 
or metadata that occur in the normal course of business, unless perhaps the 
dispute is about one event occurring in the past for which the party should 
preserve a “snapshot.”  Whichever position a party takes, however, such 
issue would seem to be a perfect candidate for the requirement in Rule 
26(f) that “the parties must, as soon as practicable . . . confer . . . to discuss 
any issues relating to preserving discoverable information.”134  Especially 
in areas that are not clear, parties acting unilaterally on preservation 
                                                 
131
  Doe v. Norwalk Community College No. 3:04-CV-1976 (JCH), 2007 WL 2066497, 
at *4, n.9 (D. Conn. July 16, 2007) (emphasis added).  See also Withers, supra note 9, at 
¶ 77: 
Almost every survey, research project, or round of commentary 
conducted on electronic discovery between 1999 and 2004 produced 
the same fundamental finding – many of the problems associated with 
electronic discovery can be worked out between opposing parties who 
meet and confer early in the litigation, before discovery formally 
begins, and who continue to communicate with each other and the court 
throughout discovery. 
132
 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
133
 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
134
  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2); see also Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 21 (stating that 
“[p]arties should confer early in discovery regarding the preservation and production of 
electronically stored information when these matters are at issue in the litigation and seek 
to agree on the scope of each party’s rights and responsibilities.”). 
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proceed at their own risk because the court may disagree with the 
unilateral decision, and there may be no case law to support that decision.  
 
III.  CONSIDERING MARGINAL UTILITY IN THE PRODUCTION OF 
ACCESSIBLE ESI 
 
A.  PROPORTIONALITY 
 
[51] Although remaining in obscurity for many years,135 the 
proportionality provisions in Rule 26(b) apply to all discovery requests, 
including requests for paper documents and ESI in accessible format.136  
Indeed, the Supreme Court inserted the proportionality provisions in Rule 
26(b)(1) in 1983, before the issue of inaccessible ESI had arisen.137   
 
 The Advisory Committee Notes for 1983 explained:  
Rule 26(b)(1) has been amended to add a sentence to deal 
with the problem of over-discovery.  The objective is to 
guard against redundant or disproportionate discovery by 
giving the court the authority to reduce the amount of 
discovery that may be directed to matters that are otherwise 
proper subjects of inquiry.138   
 
The Committee noted that a “court must apply the standards in an even-
handed manner that will prevent use of discovery to wage a war of 
attrition or as a device to coerce a party, whether financially weak or 
affluent.”139  The Committee said that the rules existing prior to the 1983 
                                                 
135
  Marcus, supra note 18, at 613. (“[T]he proportionality provisions had remained in 
obscurity for two decades, although they seemed to be getting more attention.”). 
136
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
137
 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 214-15 (1983); Richard L. Marcus, 
The 2000 Amendments to the Discovery Rules, 2001 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001). 
138
 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. at 217 (emphasis added). 
139
 Id. at 218 (emphasis added).  The new paragraph in Rule 26(b)(1) provided: 
[t]he frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in 
subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that:  (i) the 
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is 
obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less 
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had 
ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information 
sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, 
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amendments had been “exploited to the disadvantage of justice,” and that 
the practices of over-discovery “impose costs on an already overburdened 
system and impede the fundamental goal of the ‘just and speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action.’”140 
 
[52]  In 1993, the Supreme Court put the proportionality provisions into a 
separate paragraph, (b)(2), modified introductory text in the paragraph, 
and amended subparagraph (iii) of the proportionality provision to its 
current text.141  The Committee Notes stated that the changes were made 
“to enable the court to keep tighter rein on the extent of discovery.  The 
information explosion of recent decades has greatly increased both the 
potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and the potential for discovery to 
be used as an instrument for delay or oppression.”142  In 1998, the Supreme 
Court emphasized the discretion a district court has in limiting discovery 
when it said, “Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor 
discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery.”143 
 
[53]  In 2000, the Supreme Court amended Rule 26(b)(1) to include the 
following sentence: “[a]ll discovery is subject to the limitations imposed 
by Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).”144  The Committee Notes to this change 
                                                                                                                         
taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 
limitations on the parties’ resources, and the importance of the issues at 
stake in the litigation.  The court may act upon its own initiative after 
reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under subdivision (c).   
Id. at 172. 
140
  Id. at 217 (citing Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (Powell, J. concurring)). 
141
 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 403, 613-14 
(1993); see also Stephen N. Surbin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical 
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 744-45 (1998). 
142
 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. at 638; see also 
Surbin, supra note 141, at 744-45 (“We have begun to adapt to the notion of 
‘proportionality’ in discovery. . . . The court may now consider ‘the importance of the 
proposed discovery in resolving the issues.’”). 
143
 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (emphasis added). 
144
 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 
340, 388 (2000).  Amended Rule 26(b)(1) also narrowed the normal scope of discovery 
from any matter relevant to the subject matter of the action to “any matter, not privileged, 
that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”  Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square 
Peg In a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitations on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 
TENN. L. REV. 13, 13 (2001).  As a result of the 2006 amendments, discussed in the next 
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explained that the purpose of the additional sentence was to “emphasize 
the need for active judicial use of subdivision (b)(2) to control excessive 
discovery.”145 
  
[54]  As a result of the 2006 amendments, the proportionality provisions 
are now Rule 26(b)(2)(C), and provide that a court may limit the 
frequency and extent of otherwise permitted discovery if the court 
determines either: 
 
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or 
duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is 
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; 
(ii) the party seeking discovery has ample opportunity by 
discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or 
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs 
of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the 
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in 
resolving the issues.  The court may act upon its own 
initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion 
under Rule 26(c).146 
 
The Committee Notes to the 2006 Amendments state that, “[t]he 
limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) continue to apply to all discovery of 
                                                                                                                         
paragraph of text of this article, what was Rule 26(b)(2)(i)(ii) and (iii) are now located at 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i),(ii) and (iii). 
145
 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 192 F.R.D. at 390 (emphasis 
added).  In the 2000 amendments, the Supreme Court also limited the scope of discovery 
without the intervention of the trial court to non-privileged matters relevant to claims or 
defenses, rather than what the scope had previously been: anything relevant to the subject 
matter of the litigation.  Id. at 388-89.  The Committee Notes explained, “[t]he 
amendment is designed to involve the court more actively in regulating the breadth of 
sweeping or contentious discovery.”  Id. at 389.   
146
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).  Prior to December 1, 2006, what is now 26(b)(C) had 
been part of 26(b)(2).  With the 2006 amendments, what had been Rule 26(b)(2) was split 
into Rule 26(b)(2)(A) and Rule 26(b)(2)(C), and 26(b)(2)(B) was added.   
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electronically stored information, including that stored on reasonably 
accessible electronic sources.”147 
 
[55]  Judge Scheindlin, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of 
New York,148 similarly concluded that “it is important to recognize that a 
party may still object, on the grounds set forth in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) – the 
proportionality rule – to producing presumptively discoverable 
information that falls in the so-called first tier” of reasonably accessible 
information.149  Judge Scheindlin explained that “even when a source is 
accessible, a court might not require production of information from that 
source if, for example, the ‘discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative 
or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.’”150  In Zubulake II, Judge 
Scheindlin stated, “[w]hether electronic data is accessible or inaccessible 
turns largely on the media on which it is stored.”151   
 
[56]  Before discussing cases after December 1, 2006 on discovery of 
accessible ESI, what are the general lines between ESI in accessible 
format and in inaccessible format?  It is agreed that active on-line data, 
near-line data (such as robotic storage and retrieval of optical disks), and 
offline storage of optical disks that can effectively be searched when 
inserted into a computer generally are considered accessible formats.152  
On the other hand, it is agreed as a general matter that the following media 
constitute inaccessible formats:153  backup tapes;154 erased, fragmented or 
                                                 
147
 See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16 (2006), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscovery_w_Notes.pdf. 
148
 Judge Scheindin also authored the landmark discovery decisions in Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg LLC. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D. N.Y. 2003) 
(“Zubulake II”); 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D. N.Y. 2003) (“Zubulake III”); 220 F.R.D. 212 
(S.D. N.Y. 2003) (“Zubulake IV”); 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D. N.Y. 2004) (“Zubulake V”). 
149
 Scheindlin, supra note 21; see also Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 
681 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[r]ule 26(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
empowers district courts to limit the scope of discovery if ‘the discovery sought is 
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is 
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive’”). 
150
 Scheindlin, supra note 21 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)). 
151
 Zubulake II, 217 F.R.D. at 318. 
152
 Id. at 318-19. 
153
 Id. at 319. 
154
 See Sedona Glossary, supra note 110, at 5.  
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damaged data;155 and legacy data stored on obsolete systems.156  Next, this 
article turns to the cases on accessible ESI. 
 
B.  CASES DECIDED AFTER DECEMBER 1, 2006 INVOLVING INFORMATION IN 
ACCESSIBLE FORMAT 
 
[57]  There is at least one federal decision, Peskoff v. Faber, that appears 
to state Rule 26(b)(2)(C) only applies to inaccessible information and does 
not apply to data in accessible format.157   In discussing a dispute between 
the parties on the production of e-mail, Magistrate Judge Facciola stated 
that: 
 
[A]ccessible data must be produced at the cost of the 
producing party; cost-shifting does not even become a 
possibility unless there is first a showing of inaccessibility.  
Thus, it cannot be argued that a party should ever be 
relieved of its obligation to produce accessible data merely 
                                                                                                                         
ESI on backup tapes is generally recorded and stored sequentially, 
rather than randomly, meaning in order to locate and access a specific 
file or data set, all data on the tape preceding the target must be read 
first, a time-consuming and inefficient process.  Backup typically tapes 
use data compression, which increases restoration time and expense, 
given the lack of uniform standards governing data compression. 
Id.  
155
 Id. at 14 (stating that “[d]eleted data is data that existed on the computer as live data 
and which have been deleted by the computer system or end-user activity.  Deleted data 
may remain on storage media in whole or in part until they are overwritten or ‘wiped.’”); 
see also Withers, supra note 9, at ¶ 14. 
By now, all computer users should be aware that the action of 
“deleting” an electronic file does little more than change the name and 
eliminate reference to it in the operating system’s list of active files, a 
situation aptly described by computer forensics expert Joan Feldman as 
a “witness protection program for bad documents.” 
Id. at ¶ 14 (quoting Joan Feldman, “Technology Experts Panel,” Presentation Before the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules at Hasting College of Law (Mar. 27, 2000). 
156
  Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318-20; see also Scheindlin, supra note 21, at 16; Sedona 
Glossary, supra note 110, at 30 (stating that “[l]egacy [d]ata is ESI . . . created or stored 
by the use of software and/or hardware that has become obsolete or replaced. . . . Legacy 
data may be costly to restore or reconstruct when required for investigation or litigation 
analysis or discovery.”)  
157
 Peskoff v. Faber, 240 F.R.D. 26 (D.D.C. 2007). 
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because it may take time and effort to find what is 
necessary.158  
 
The second sentence is accurate because under 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), a court 
cannot limit production simply because of costs; it must balance costs 
against the likely benefits and other factors.  However, the first sentence - 
that there can only be cost-shifting if the information sought is accessible - 
is not accurate. 
 
[58]  The court in the first Peskoff opinion cited two cases, Zubulake v. 
UBS Warburg LLC159 and Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders.160  
Interestingly, neither Zubulake nor Oppenheimer stand for the proposition 
that a party can only be relieved of its obligation to produce documents if 
there has been a showing of inaccessibility.  In Zubulake, before the 
adoption of 26(b)(2)(B), Judge Scheindlin did state that the presumption 
was the responding party must bear the expense of complying with 
discovery requests,161 but she also said that under the Rule 26 
proportionality test, a court could condition discovery on the requesting 
party’s payment of costs of discovery.162  Although inaccessible data from 
backup tapes was at issue in Zubulake, the court’s statements about cost 
shifting were not limited to inaccessible data.  Saying the presumption is 
that the producing party must bear the cost of production, as the court said 
in Zubulake, is different than saying the producing party must always bear 
the cost of production, as the court suggested in the first quoted sentence 
above in Peskoff.   
 
[59]  In Oppenheimer, the United States Supreme Court similarly (to the 
court in Zubulake) said that:  
 
[T]he presumption is that the responding party must bear 
the expense of complying with discovery requests, but he 
may invoke the district’s court’s discretion under Rule 
26(c) to grant orders protecting him from ‘undue burden or 
                                                 
158
 Id. at 31. 
159
 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 280 
160
 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978). 
161
 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 283. 
162
 Id. 
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expense’ in doing so, including orders conditioning 
discovery on the requesting party’s payment of the cost of 
discovery.163  
  
The Court did not limit this statement to inaccessible information.164 
 
[60]  In a subsequent decision in Peskoff, Magistrate Judge Facciola 
seemed to modify his previous statement in the original Peskoff decision, 
or at least put it in different context. 165   He stated that when an objection 
is made, “the search for data, even if accessible, must be justified under 
the relevancy standard of Rule 26(b)(1).”166  He added:  
 
The point is that balancing under Rule 26(b)(2)(C) was not 
invoked here to oppose the search, and I cannot accept the 
proposition that Faber may be relieved of searching 
accessible data when he does not argue that the search is 
not justified by the potential relevancy of what may be 
found.167   
 
The court added: 
 
I am hard pressed to understand why I am required to, sua 
sponte, balance utility against cost and relieve Faber of 
searching accessible, relevant data any more than I would 
have to do the same balancing before I required him to look 
through the file cabinet outside his office for a paper file.168  
  
                                                 
163
 Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 358. 
164
 Id. Oppenheimer involved the propriety of shifting the costs of notifying a class of the 
pendency of the action.  The discovery rule was only mentioned to draw an analogy.  Id. 
165
 Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54 (D.D.C. 2007). 
166
 Id. at 63. 
167
 Id.  In fact, the last sentence in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) allows a court to limit discovery “on 
its own initiative after reasonable notice.”  However, certainly Magistrate Judge 
Facciola’s statement that the producing party must make an objection states the practice 
in his court and is a reasonable position.  How is a court able to know when discovery is 
excessive unless a party objects and brings it to the attention of the court? 
168
 Peskoff, 244 F.R.D. at 62-63. 
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In other words, the court in Peskoff recognized that a court can limit the 
production of relevant, accessible data under the proportionality 
provisions in 26(b)(2)(C).169 
 
[61]  Other decisions since the effective date of the ESI rules support the 
conclusion that a court can condition or limit the requested production of 
accessible information.  Bolton v. Sprint/United Management Company 
was an age discrimination case that thirteen plaintiffs filed, challenging a 
reduction in force by the defendants and alleging violations of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. 170  The plaintiffs moved to compel the 
defendants to produce certain accessible ESI, electronic files in active 
databases.  Although not citing 26(b)(2)(C), the court said it must balance 
the burden on the producing party against the benefit to the discovering 
party and should allow the discovery, unless the hardship was 
“unreasonable compared to the benefits to be secured from the 
discovery.”171  Balancing the likely benefits against the burden, the court 
rejected six of the plaintiffs’ fourteen requests for documents. 
 
[62]  In Hill v. Eddie Bauer, the court rejected a request for accessible 
comprehensive wage and hour documents. 172  In Hill, the plaintiffs filed 
individual and class action law suits against Eddie Bauer, alleging, among 
other things, that Eddie Bauer violated the California labor code for 
unpaid overtime, and sought, for all putative class members, 
                                                 
169
 Id. (“[A] party must search available electronic systems to answer any discovery 
requests not objected to . . . .”). 
170
   Bolton v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 05-2361-JWL, 2007 WL 756644, at *1 (D. 
Kan. Mar. 8, 2007). 
171
 Id. at *3.  Interestingly, the court concluded that the request for certain data within a 
database was overly broad, because the department in Sprint that would have been 
responsible for retrieving the information was understaffed and that responding to the 
request would take at least eighty hours.  Id. at *4.  In contrast, the court concluded that a 
request for information in native format pertained to all employees selected for 
termination and a reduction in force during certain time periods, even though the 
testimony that the process required to respond to this request would take far in excess of 
the eighty hours needed to respond to request 1.  Id. It would appear the difference was 
the more direct relevance, and thus benefit, of the information sought in request 3 
(pertaining to employees who had been selected for termination), compared to request 1 
(information concerning all employees).   
172
 Hill v. Eddie Bauer, 242 F.R.D. 556, 563 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (indicating that the records 
involved certain reports that could be generated electronically). 
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documentation relating to the hours, wages, business related expenses, 
repayment of wages to employer, termination wages, meal breaks, and rest 
breaks.173  The court relied, in part, on Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which provides that the federal rules “shall be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 
every action.”174  The court stated that: 
 
To track historical sales of Eddie Bauer merchandise to 
employees for a period longer than the immediately 
preceding six months, hard copy sales records must be 
gathered manually and reviewed by a live individual.  Sales 
records [were] maintained both at [defendant’s] corporate  
campus in Redmond, Washington as well as off-site.175   
 
The court concluded that it would be unduly burdensome to respond to 
these document requests, but that the plaintiff was entitled to responsive 
sample information to pursue class action certification.176 
 
[63]  Another court also limited pre-certification class discovery for 
information that included data in accessible format, based on balancing 
burdens and benefits, in O’Bar v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc.177  A 
particular issue in this employment discrimination case was whether the 
plaintiffs had standing to represent the class.178  The court limited 
precertification discovery to managers and officers at the regional, district 
and national level.179 
 
                                                 
173
 Id. at 560  
174
 Id.  (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
175
 Id. at 563. 
176
 Id. at 564.  The court stated, however, that it might reconsider its limitation on the 
discovery of this request “in the event plaintiff’s experts are unable to devise some 
statistical analysis based on sampling data, and opine they need data from all 1,800 
putative class members.”  Id. at 565. 
177
 O’Bar v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 5:04-cv-00019-W, 2007 WL 1299180 
(W.D.N.C. May 2, 2007).  The court limited pre-class production not simply with respect 
to information it deemed inaccessible, but did include specific guidelines for information 
not reasonably accessible.   
178
  Id. at *1. 
179
  Id. at *3. 
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[64]  The court in Fifty-Six Hope Road Music Ltd. v. Mayah Collections, 
Inc. also limited discovery of accessible information after expressly 
considering the Rule 26(b)(2)(C) balancing factors. 180 Fifty-Six Hope 
Road was a case alleging trademark infringement and the defense of 
abandonment of the mark.  The court said that under Rule 26(b)(2)(C): 
 
[T]he court on its own initiative after reasonable notice or 
pursuant to a motion under Rule 26(c), may limit the 
discovery sought if it determines that it is unreasonably 
cumulative or duplicative or the burden and expenses of the 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit taking into account 
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties 
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the 
litigation and the importance of the proposed discovery in 
resolving the issues.181  
  
[65]  The court in Fifty-Six Hope Road then denied the requests for all 
advertisements and documents evidencing use of the marks at issue since 
the first date of use.182  The court said: 
 
[E]ven some minor or limited use in a given year is 
sufficient to defeat a claim of abandonment.  The Court 
will, therefore, order that, to the extent they have not done 
so, Plaintiffs produce representative documents showing 
that they made use of the marks in the years since the mark 
was first used.183  
 
[66]  In Haka v. Lincoln County, the requested information included active 
data on external hard drives – accessible information.184   Referring to the 
balancing factors in 26(b)(2)(C), the court took into account the dollar 
amount at issue in the case, rejected the request to copy and produce the 
hard drives in their entirety, and said instead that:  
                                                 
180
 Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, Ltd. v. Mayah Collections, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-0105-KJD-
GWF, 2007 WL 1726558 (D. Nev. June 11, 2007).  The disputed requests included 
advertisements and apparently other paper documents.  
181
 Id. at *4 (emphasis added). 
182
 Id. at *10. 
183
 Id. 
184
 Haka v. Lincoln County, 246 F.R.D. 577 (W.D. Wis. 2007) 
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[F]airness and efficiency require the parties to proceed 
incrementally, limiting the initial search to the e-mail 
stored on the hard drives.  Plaintiff is required to narrow his 
search terms to the narrowest set with which he is 
comfortable.  Any additional searches shall occur only by 
joint agreement or court order.  The parties will divide the 
cost of performing plaintiff’s term searches of the e-mail 
50/50.185   
 
In other words, the court ordered cost sharing, even though the e-mails 
were in accessible format. 
 
[67]  In Smith v. Café Asia, in responding to a request for discovery of 
images stored on a cell phone – accessible information – Magistrate Judge 
Facciola said that “relevancy alone does not entitle a requesting party to 
carte blanche in discovery,” citing the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Crawford-El v. Britton. 186  Magistrate Judge Facciola also pointed out that 
admissibility of the discovery being sought could be an important 
consideration, even though information sought in discovery generally did 
not have to be admissible, but only reasonably likely to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.  If the items sought in discovery were, 
in fact, items the requesting party would seek to admit at trial, then “the 
question of discoverability is inseparable from admissibility.”187  
Magistrate Judge Facciola ordered that the images on the cell phone be 
preserved, but that only one attorney for the plaintiff be designated by the 
defendant to inspect the images, so subsequently both the plaintiff and the 
defendant could make an argument on admissibility to the trial judge. 
 
[68]  The production of e-mails in Lotus Notes format, an accessible 
format, was at issue in Parkdale America, LLC v. Travelers Casualty and 
Surety Company of America, Inc.188  Parkdale was a declaratory judgment 
                                                 
185
 Id. at 579.  There would also be inaccessible data on the hard drives, such as deleted 
files.  However, this decision addressed accessible ESI and limited the search for 
accessible ESI. 
186
 Smith v. Café Asia, 246 F.R.D. 19, 20 ( D.D.C. 2007) (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 
523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)). 
187
 Id. at 20. 
188
 ParkDale Am., LLC. v. Travelers Cas. & Surety Co. of Am., No. 3:06CV78-R, 2007 
WL 4165247 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2007).  
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action to determine whether the insurance company had a duty to defend 
and indemnify Parkdale in an antitrust lawsuit.  The court applied Rule 
26(b)(2)(C), noted that the insurance policy at issue in the case was over 
$2.7 million and the cost of producing the e-mails not more than $20,000, 
and concluded that the “Plaintiffs have not articulated a sufficient basis to 
relieve them of their obligation to produce e-mails.”189  The court also 
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the e-mails were 
“not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”190  It is 
unclear if the court thought “not reasonably accessible” was a separate test 
from the 26(b)(2)(C) test. 
 
[69]  In PSEG Power New York, Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., a 
dispute over a construction contract, as the result of some incompatibility 
between the software used by PSEG and the vendor, PSEG initially 
produced documents that had been attached to e-mails separately from the 
e-mails. 191  The court said the e-mails/attachments still existed in their 
original pst files, with nothing lost.  PSEG could collect the documents 
attached to the e-mails by running another search, but at an additional cost 
that PSEG did not want to bear.  The court applied the 26(b)(2)(C) 
proportionality test and rejected switching any cost to Alberici, largely 
because originally, the “attachments should have been produced with their 
corresponding e-mails as such are kept in the usual course of business.”192  
The court did acknowledge, however, that the presumption that the 
producing party bears the expense of complying with discovery requests 
“may place an undue burden or cost upon the responding party, especially 
when it comes to electronic discovery.”193 
 
[70]  The court ordered the production of a database in Ryan v. Stanton 
Island University Hospital.194  The plaintiff, on behalf of her deceased 
husband, sued the defendant for medical malpractice, fraud, and other 
claims. The discovery issue revolved around a database of patients who 
                                                 
189
 Id. at *13. 
190
 Id. at *12. 
191
 PSEG Power NY, Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657, 2007 WL 
2687670, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) 
192
 Id. at *12. 
193
 Id. at *10 
194
 Ryan v. Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., No. 04-CV-2666, 2006 WL 3497875 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 
5, 2006). 
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had received radiosurgery, and the defendant had produced a paper 
document that purported to be a printout of a database listing all of the 
patients who were treated with radiosurgery, their diagnoses, years of 
treatment, and types and locations of cancer, through December 31, 2002.  
The court ordered the defendant to produce a complete and true copy of 
the database.195  The court said, “[p]ursuant to Rule 26(b), any information 
that is not privileged and is ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence’ may be discovered.”196  The producing party had 
objected on the grounds that the production would reveal privileged or 
other confidential information, not on the grounds that the information 
would be cumulative or was simply a fishing expedition.  In its order, the 
court attempted to address the privilege/confidentiality objection in the 
limits placed on production.197 
 
C.  PRINCIPLES 
 
[71]  Courts have the authority under Rule 26(b)(2)(C) to restrict and put 
conditions on discovery of relevant and accessible documents and ESI.198  
                                                 
195
 Id. at *8.   
196
 Id. at *4.  The court appeared to treat the database as accessible ESI.  Requests for 
information from databases may not always be construed as a request for information 
from an accessible source.  For instance, in discussing inaccessible formats, the 
Committee Notes for the ESI Rules said, “Examples from current technology 
include…databases that were designed to create certain information in certain ways and 
that cannot readily create very different kinds or forms of information.”  234 F.R.D. at 
331. 
197
 The court ordered production of the database “in electronic and hard copy, subject to 
the redaction only of the patients’ names, addresses, telephone numbers and social 
security numbers, and specifically stamped ‘REDACTED’ on each and every entry for 
which information was redacted.”  Ryan, 2006 WL 3497875 at *8.  The court did not 
explain in the decision how a completed database could be produced in electronic format, 
with REDACTED stamped on each element that, in fact, was redacted. 
198
          The amended rule does not say that judges may only consider cost allocation if  
the subject of the discovery is electronically stored information; if the 
electronically stored information is not reasonably accessible, or if the 
costs that the producing party is seeking to shift go beyond the costs of 
forensic work necessary to make certain information accessible. 
Rosenthal, supra note 1.  Phrases taken out of context are often misleading.  The 
statement in Peskoff that “accessible data must be produced” is subject to the 
qualification in the next Peskoff decision - unless the producing party objects to such 
production.  See supra text accompanying notes 27-28, 35-39.  The statement in Ryan 
that a party may discover any non-privileged information likely to lead to the discovery 
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The 2007 decisions in Bolton, Hill, O’Bar, Fifty-Six Hope Road, Haka, 
and Smith support this position.199   As the Committee Notes state, “the 
limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) continue to apply to all discovery of 
electronically stored information, including that stored on reasonably 
accessible electronic sources.”200   
 
[72]  Another 2007 decision, Christian v. Central Records Service, 
involving a requested search for printed copies of e-mails in an individual 
employment discrimination case, also supports the application of Rule 
26(b)(2)(C) to limit requests for production of relevant information in 
accessible format. 201  In Christian, the plaintiff requested “all of her e-
mails from the date of her hire until the date of her termination,” and 
Central Records responded that the requested e-mails “have been deleted 
in the normal course of business.”202  The plaintiff said she always printed 
out her e-mails and asked the court to order Central Records to search 
several hundred thousand boxes in storage for those e-mails.  The court 
rejected the request, stating, “[t]he ability to discovery and retrieve the e-
mails in question would be unnecessarily burdensome to the Defendant.  
Even if the court would order a sample of the various boxes the sample 
size, to be effective, would be cost prohibitive and may not produce any of 
the requested e-mails.”203 
                                                                                                                         
of admissible evidence is also subject to the same qualification - unless the producing 
party raises a valid objection to its production.  In Ryan, the court cited National 
Congress for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 194 F.R.D. 88, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) for the proposition of what information may be discovered.  In National Congress, 
Judge Scheindlin made the general statement that all relevant materials likely to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence are discoverable, and then added the qualification, 
“Given the breadth of discovery in federal actions, all of the documents listed above are 
relevant—whether they are discoverable is a different matter.”  Id. at 92.  In other words, 
whether some information is within the scope of permissible discovery is a separate issue 
than whether the court should allow discovery of that information. 
199
  See supra text accompanying notes 170-84. 
200
 234 F.R.D. at 339 (emphasis added). 
201
 Christian v. Cent. Record Serv., No. 2:06-CR-2198-RTD, 2007 WL 3094513 (W.D. 
Ark. Oct. 19, 2007).  Central Records Service provides record storage and retrieval 
services for other businesses and to individuals.  Id. at *1. 
202
 Id.  It is not clear whether the deletion occurred before the obligation to preserve ESI 
attached, and in any case, the decision does not mention any motion for sanctions for the 
deletion of the e-mails. 
203
 Id. at *2 (citing Rule 26(b)(2) and Roberts v. Shawnee Mission Ford, Inc., 352 F.3d 
358, 361 (8th Cir. 2003)).  The paper documents in boxes were in accessible format.  
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[73]  Monetary expense does not even have to be an express factor to limit 
production under Rule 26(b)(2)(C).  A court can limit discovery if “the 
information is obtainable from some other source that is more 
convenient,”204 or if the requesting party has already had ample 
opportunity to obtain the requested information.205  Under Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)(i), a court can limit discovery if “the discovery sought is 
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative.”206   
 
[74]  As the modifications to Rule 26(b) over the last twenty-five years 
show, Rule 26(b) instructs the parties to engage in, and the courts to 
enforce, discovery proportionate to the circumstances of the case.207  
Requests for “all information” pertaining to a particular topic often are 
overly broad.208  When parties object, courts should narrow requests to 
search all the e-mails and documents of all employees, or search all 
servers of a company, including cache files, when it is reasonably 
anticipated that the documents and e-mails of the key employees are likely 
to be found on specific servers, or a limited sample of information may 
                                                                                                                         
However, the cost of retrieving and searching the boxes caused the court to determine 
that production would be unnecessarily burdensome.  When the only issue arguing 
against production of accessible information is cost, as appeared to be the case in 
Christian, Parkdale and PSEG, it is reasonable to conclude the objecting party should 
have a more difficult time persuading the court to reject production than when there are 
additional objections to production, such as the request is duplicative or an unnecessary 
fishing expedition unlikely to produce additional, important information in light of what 
has already been produced. 
204
 FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i).  
205
 FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(ii). 
206
 Of course, a party who objects to a request as “unreasonably cumulative” can attempt 
to put a dollar value on the amount of staff time required to comply with the request, but 
only 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) expressly refers to “expense.” 
207
 Cf., In re Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. 428, 430 (E.D. Pa. 
2004) (stating that the “plaintiffs’ request for sales data through the end of 2003 is 
unreasonable given the minimum potential benefits of this information”). 
208
 See, e.g., Johnson v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 535, 542 (D. Kan. 2006); 
Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 03-2200-JWL-DJW, 2006 WL 2734465, at *7 
(D. Kan. Sept. 25, 2006); BG Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. Am. Equity Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 
04-3408, 2005 WL 1309048, at *5 (E.D. La. May 18, 2005); Byers v. Ill. State Police, 
No. 99 C 8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *11 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002); Cardenas v. Dorel, 
232 F.R.D. 377, 382 (D. Kan. 2005); Wright v. AmSouth Bancorporation, 320 F. 3d 
1198, 1205 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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serve the same purpose more efficiently.209  Courts should also reject or 
narrow vague requests that will require the producing party to spend a lot 
of time evaluating documents to determine if they are responsive.210 
                                                 
209
 Cf. Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, Ltd. v. Mayah Collections, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-0105-
KJD-GWF, 2007 WL 1726558 (D. Nev. June 11, 2007); Wells v. XPEDX, No. 8:05-CV-
2193-T-EAJ, 2007 WL 1200955 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2007); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 
No. 04-1245-MLB, 2006 WL 33885024 (D. Kan. Spet. 5, 2006); Quinby v. Westlb AG, 
No. 04Civ.7406(WHP)(HBP), 2005 WL 3453908 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Quinby v. Westlb 
AG, No. 04Civ.7406 WHP HBP, 2006 WL 59521 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Quinby v. Westlb 
AG, 245 F.R.D. 94 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2006); supra text accompanying notes 180-86.  
Where samples are identified for initial production, it may be logical to expect a 
stipulation that the fact at issue will be decided based on the sample, or an agreement to 
preserve the more extensive information not included in the sample, in case it was later 
determined the sample was not sufficient.  Cache is “a dedicated, high speed storage 
location which can be used for the temporary storage of frequently used data.  As data 
may be retrieved more quickly from cache than the original storage location, cache 
allows applications to run more quickly.  Web site contents often reside in cached storage 
locations on a hard drive.” See Sedona Conference Glossary, supra note 110. 
210
 Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co., No. 03-2200-JWL-DJW, 2006 WL 
2734465, *7 (D. Kan. Sept. 25, 2006) (stating that "[c]ourts may find requests overly 
broad when they are 'couched in such broad language as to make arduous the task of 
deciding which of numerous documents may conceivably fall within [their] scope.'” 
(emphasis added)).  See also Sedona Principle 4 (stating that “[d]iscovery requests for 
electronically stored information should be as clear as possible, while responses and 
objections to discovery should disclose the scope and limits of the production.”).  In such 
case, the producing party may have to produce a subset of the requested information.  
See, e.g., Johnson, 236 F.R.D. at 542 (stating that “[d]espite the overly broad nature of 
Requests 7, 8, and 10 on their face, the Court is mindful of a party’s duty under the 
federal rules to respond to the extent that discovery requests are not objectionable”). 
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[75]  As in Haka,211 limitations on key word searches can make sense.212 
No method of reviewing ESI electronically, so far, produces very accurate 
results.213  Production based on broad word searches alone is likely: (1) to 
result in the over-production of proprietary material that the receiving 
party has no right to receive but receives anyway;214 or (2) to require a 
large amount of time spent by the producing party individually reviewing 
                                                 
211
 Haka v. Lincoln County, 246 F.R.D. 577, 579 (W.D. Wis. 2007). 
212
  See also Quinby v. Westlb AG, 245 FRD 94,106 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that 
“[f]ollowing multiple conferences before me, the electronic discovery as it pertained to e-
mails was limited to searches of seventeen current and former WestLB employees, 
utilizing a limited number of search terms and, in some instances, more limited time 
frames.”); Alexander v. Fed. Bureau of Investigations, 194 F.R.D. 316, 335 (D.D.C. 
2000): 
The EOP [Executive Office of the President] responds, however, that 
the burden of searching the e-mails of those individuals with such 
attenuated knowledge to any relevant issues far outweighs any likely 
benefit that would be obtained by adding these persons to the list. The 
court agrees with the EOP's argument. The court further notes, as 
discussed above, that to the extent that any of these persons sent or 
received e-mails to or from those persons already included in the search 
who are alleged to be directly involved in the matters at issue, those e-
mails will already be captured by the more limited search.  
Id. 
213
 Paul & Baron, supra note 1, at ¶ 40. 
[T]he assumption on the part of lawyers that any form of present-day 
search methodology will fully find ‘all’ or ‘nearly’ all available 
documents in a large, heterogeneous collection of data is wrong in the 
extreme.  A leading study by Blair & Maron, where the legal teams 
only found 20% of the responsive documents in a large subway crash 
case, has been widely cited as recognizing this inherent problem.  
Id.   See also The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on 
the Use of Search & Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 
THE SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 199-204 (Fall 2007). 
214
 In explaining the general limitation on the scope of discovery in 2000 to non-
privileged matters relevant to the claims or defenses in the case rather than the subject 
matter of the case, the Committee said the change “signals to the parties that they have no 
entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are not already identified 
in the pleadings.” Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340, 389 
(2000).  Production based simply on word searches can provide free fishing for the 
requesting party into uncharted and unclaimed waters, in spite of the intention of the 
rules.  Of course, word searches can miss relevant documents also.  However, initial 
“under-production” from word searches can be corrected over time through stages of 
discovery.  In other words, start with certain word searches and compare the results with 
what would reasonably be expected. 
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the documents flagged by the electronic search to determine which of the 
documents flagged by the computer are, in fact, responsive and not 
privileged.   
 
[76]  Court restrictions on the timing of discovery also can be appropriate.  
For instance, as long as the parties preserve the information, there is no 
reason to approve broad class-wide discovery before the court has 
determined whether there is a valid class.215  Similarly, since the 
appropriate remedy in a case, if any, may change over time, as long as the 
parties preserve the information, it may make sense to limit discovery of 
damages until later in the case.216   
 
[77]  As in the case of preservation decisions, counsel and parties cannot 
safely take decisions on overbreadth, or other production decisions, into 
their own hands—they must object if they are not going to produce.217  For 
instance, in Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.,218 Qualcomm responded 
to a request for production of documents by stating, “Qualcomm will 
produce non-privileged relevant and responsive documents describing 
Qualcomm's participation in the JVT, if any, which can be located after a 
reasonable search.”  However, Qualcomm did not produce thousands of 
pages of ESI (e-mail) that the court deemed relevant, and Qualcomm 
argued the court should take no action when the failure to produce was 
discovered because Broadcom had not objected to Qualcomm’s discovery 
response.  The court rejected this argument as “gamesmanship”219 and 
                                                 
215
 See, e.g., Hill v. Eddie Bauer, 242 F.R.D. 556 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Rebman v. Follett 
Higher Educ. Group, Inc. 2007 U.S. Dist. WL 1303031, at * 3 (M.D. Fla. May 3, 2007). 
216
 Rebman, 2007 WL 130303, at *3. 
217
 See Sedona Principles, supra note 13 (stating that “[d]iscovery requests for 
electronically stored information should be as clear as possible, while responses and 
objections to discovery should disclose the scope and limits of the production.”). 
218
 Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. WL 66932, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 
7, 2008). 
219
 Id. at *8 n. 4. 
This argument is indicative of the gamesmanship Qualcomm engaged 
in throughout this litigation. Why should Broadcom file a motion to 
compel when Qualcomm agreed to produce the documents? What 
would the court have compelled: Qualcomm to do what it already said 
it would do? Should all parties file motions to compel to preserve their 
rights in case the other side hides documents?  
Id.    
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ruled that “agreeing to produce certain categories of documents and then 
not producing all of the documents that fit within such a category is 
unacceptable. Qualcomm's conduct warrants sanctions.”220   
 
[78]  Unnecessary discovery and secrecy both burden the judicial process.  
The Supreme Court adopted the proportionality rule to enable courts and 
parties to constrain excessive discovery.  In light of the ESI explosion, 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C), used openly, is perhaps today, an even more important 
tool to restrain excessive discovery than it was in 1983.  
 
IV.  PRODUCTION OF REGULARLY CHANGING ESI 
 
A.  METADATA 
 
1.  DEFINITIONS 
 
[79]   The possible relevance and use of metadata221 can vary significantly, 
depending on the type of metadata involved.222  Although this article cites 
the definitions of types of metadata from the Sedona Glossary, there are 
not generally agreed upon definitions of the types of metadata.223 
 
 
                                                 
220
 Id. at *9.    
221
 Sedona Conference Glossary for E-Discovery and Digital Information Management 
(the “Sedona Glossary”) defines metadata as: 
[I]nformation about a particular data set or document which describes 
how, when and by whom it was collected, created, accessed, modified 
and how it is formatted. Can be altered intentionally or inadvertently.  
Can be extracted when native files are converted to image. Some 
metadata, such as file dates and sizes, can easily be seen by users; other 
metadata can be hidden or embedded and unavailable to computer users 
who are not technically adept.  Metadata is generally not reproduced in 
full form when a document is printed.  
Sedona Glossary, supra note 110, at 28.   
222
 Allman, supra note 8, at *31 (stating that “[t]he need for metadata and embedded data 
varies depending upon the type of ESI involved and the issues in the case.”). 
223
 Lucia Cucu, The Requirement for Metadata Production Under Williams v. 
Sprint/United Management Co.: An Unnecessary Burden for Litigants Engaged in 
Electronic Discovery, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 229, 236 (2007) (stating that “metadata 
is not clearly defined . . . different courts have used the word ‘metadata’ to mean different 
things”). 
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[80]  The Sedona Glossary defines user-added metadata as, “data or work 
product created by a user while reviewing a document, including 
annotations and subjective coding information.”224  This type of metadata 
can often be privileged or constitute attorney-work product.  Some place 
the “track changes” function and the invisible spreadsheet formulas of 
Microsoft Word in this category.225  Arguably, this type of metadata is 
more likely to be relevant than other types of metadata, and not otherwise 
available in the document.  For instance, although the author and date of 
creation are often very important and revealed in document metadata, 
which is discussed next, information about author and date is often 
apparent from the document itself. 
 
[81]  The Sedona Glossary defines document metadata as, “data about the 
document stored in the document, as opposed to document content.  Often 
this data is not immediately viewable in the software application used to 
create/edit the document but often can be accessed via a ‘Properties’ view.  
Examples include document author and company, and create and revision 
dates.”226   
 
[82]  The Sedona Glossary defines e-mail metadata as, “data stored in the 
e-mail about the e-mail.  Often this data is not even viewable in the e-mail 
client application used to create the e-mail.  The amount of e-mail 
metadata available for a particular e-mail varies greatly depending on the 
e-mail system.”227  This metadata can include “internet protocol addresses, 
the dates the e-mail was sent, received, replied to and forwarded, and . . . 
blind carbon copy (‘bcc’) information and sender address book data.”228 
 
[83]  The Sedona Glossary defines file system metadata as, “data that can 
be obtained or extracted about a file from the file system storing the file.  
                                                 
224
 See Sedona Glossary, supra note 110, at 45. 
225
 Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 3-4 (referring to formulas in spreadsheets as 
metadata); Favro, supra note 19, at *7-10 (discussing track changes and formulas as 
metadata).  Cf. Cucu, supra note 223, at 229, 236 (stating that “[t]he Williams court 
[Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 647 (D. Kan. 2005)] . . . 
viewed spreadsheet formulas as metadata, but it is not clear why such formulas are not a 
part of the document instead.”). 
226
 See Sedona Glossary, supra note 110, at 16. 
227
 Id. at 18. 
228
 Favro, supra note 19, at *9. 
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Examples include file creation time, last modification time, and last access 
time.” 229 
 
[84]  In considering the production of metadata, it is necessary to consider 
Rule 34 on the form of production, even though that Rule and the 
Committee Notes do not take a position on whether a responding party 
must produce metadata.230  The next section, therefore, reviews the 
applicable parts of Rule 34 and the Committee Notes. 
 
2.  RULE 34 
 
[85]  Rule 34(b)(1)(C) provides that the requesting party “may specify the 
form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be 
produced.”231  Rule 34(b)(2)(D) provides that the responding party may 
object to the form in which the requesting party asks for the ESI, and if  it 
does object, it must specify the form in which it proposes to produce the 
ESI.232  Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(ii) provides that absent a court order or 
stipulation, “[i]f a request does not specify a form for producing 
electronically stored information, a party must produce it in a form or 
forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form 
or forms.”233  If either party raises objection to the form, then of course the 
court decides the form.234 
 
                                                 
229
 See Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 4 (stating generally “metadata will have no 
evidentiary value - it does not matter when a document was printed, or who typed the 
revisions, or what edits were made before the document was circulated.”). 
230
 Cucu, supra note 223, at 224. 
231
 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C). 
232
 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(D). 
233
 FED. R. CIV. P. 34, Committee Notes, 1993 Amendments. 
A number of commentators expressed concern that ‘a form ordinarily 
maintained’ required ‘native format’ production, which can have 
disadvantages ranging from an inability to redact, leading to privilege 
problems; an inability to bates-stamp the ‘document’ for purposes of 
litigation management and control . . . ; and the receiving party’s ability 
to create ‘documents’ from the produced native format data and present 
them back to the producing party as deposition or proposed trial 
exhibits that, while based on the native format data and produced, are 
totally unfamiliar to the producing party.  
Id.  
234
 FED. R. CIV. P. 34, Committee Notes, 2006 Amendment.  
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[86]  The Committee Notes on Rule 34 state, “[i]f the responding party 
ordinarily maintains the information it is producing in a way that makes it 
searchable by electronic means, the information should not be produced in 
a form that removes or significantly degrades this feature.”235  In addition, 
the Committee Notes say, “[u]nder some circumstances, the responding 
party may need to provide some reasonable amount of technical support, 
information on application software, or other reasonable assistance to 
enable the requesting party to use the information.”236  The Committee 
Notes also warn: 
 
A party that responds to a discovery request by simply 
producing electronically stored information in a form of its 
choice, without identifying that form in advance of 
production . . . runs a risk that the requesting party can 
show that the produced form is not reasonably usable and 
that it is entitled to production of some or all of the 
information in an additional form.237   
 
[87]  The language of the Rule and Committee Notes add a consideration 
beyond relevance to responding to requests for production of metadata.  
The additional consideration is that metadata can assist in making the 
“document” part of the ESI more usable, and that in turn may require the 
production of metadata, even though by itself, the metadata is not 
relevant.238 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
235
 Id. 
236
 Id. 
237
 Id. 
238
 Perhaps an analogy is the requirement imposed by some courts that the producing 
party provide an index or other direction for the production of paper documents.  See, 
e.g., Ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 05-CV-329-GKF-SAJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
WL 1498973, at *5 (N.D. Okla. May 17, 2007) (stating, “[T]o the extent the producing 
party elects to produce responsive documents as they are kept in the ordinary course of 
business, it must either direct the responding party to the location or locations within its 
files where documents responsive to each of their specific requests may be found, or 
provide a key or index to assist the responding party in locating the responsive 
documents.”); Wagner v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 606, 611 (D. Neb. 2001). 
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3.  METADATA CASES 
 
[88]  The plaintiff sought to compel the production of “metadata for 
virtually all records maintained in electronic form which have been 
produced to date” in Kentucky Speedway LLC v. National Ass’n of Stock 
Car Auto Racing, Inc.239  The court disagreed with what it said was the 
decision in Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., “that a producing party 
‘should produce electronic documents with the metadata intact unless the 
party timely objects… the parties agree that the metadata should not be 
produced, or the producing party requests a protective order.’”240  The 
court agreed with the decision of Wyath v. Impax Labs., Inc. that emerging 
standards on ESI “‘appear to articulate a general presumption against the 
production of metadata.’” 241    
 
[89]  The court in Kentucky Speedway continued that “in most cases for 
most documents, metadata does not provide relevant information….  
Depending on the format, the metadata may identify the typist but not the 
document’s author, or even just a specific computer from which the 
document originated or was generated.”242  The court concluded that “[t]o 
the extent that plaintiff seeks metadata for a specific document or 
documents where date and authorship information is unknown but 
relevant, plaintiff should identify that document or documents by Bates 
Number or by other reasonably identifying features.”243  Whether the court 
                                                 
239
 Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., No. 05-138-
WOB, 2007 WL 4260517, at *21 (E.D. Ken. Dec. 18, 2006). 
240
 Id. at *22 (quoting Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 652 (D. 
Kan. 2005)).  Although the quote from Williams is accurate, the decision in Williams 
does not, in fact, suggest that metadata should generally be produced.  Referring to 
Sedona Principle 12, the court said that “emerging standards of electronic discovery 
appear to articulate a general presumption against the production of metadata, but provide 
a clear caveat when the producing party is aware or should be reasonably aware that 
particular metadata is relevant to the dispute.”  Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 652.  Williams 
simply advises producing parties that they are in the best position to object to the 
production of the relevance or privileged nature of any metadata, and thus have the 
obligation to object, when appropriate.  Id. at 652.  (holding “that party already has 
access to the metadata and is in the best position to determine whether producing it is 
objectionable”). 
241
 Kentucky Speedway, 2007 WL 4260517, at *22 (quoting Wyeth v. Impax Labs. Inc., 
No. Civ.A. 06-222-JJF, 2006 WL 3091331, at *2 (D. Del. Oct. 26, 2006)). 
242
 Id. at *24 
243
 Id. 
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thought the metadata was application metadata or file system metadata, as 
defined above, clearly user-added metadata (which is more likely to be 
relevant) was not at issue. 
 
[90]  The court in Kentucky Speedway rejected Williams and relied on 
Wyeth, but those two decisions involved significantly different facts that 
emphasize the importance of understanding the type of ESI and metadata 
involved.  In Williams, the issue was the production of Excel spreadsheets 
in electronic formats, including metadata.  The court said that generally, 
“the more interactive the application, the more important the metadata is 
to understanding the application's output. At one end of the spectrum is a 
word processing application where the metadata is usually not critical to 
understanding the substance of the document.”244   In contrast, the court 
concluded that the tables of a database would have “little meaning” 
without the metadata.245  With respect to Excel spreadsheets, the court 
said, “[w]hile metadata is not as crucial to understanding a spreadsheet as 
it is to a database application, a spreadsheet's metadata may be necessary 
to understand the spreadsheet because the cells containing formulas, which 
arguably are metadata themselves, often display a value rather than the 
formula itself.”246  In short, the type of ESI and metadata involved seemed 
crucial to the court’s decision in Williams. 
 
[91]  Just as Williams does not stand for the proposition that a party must 
always produce metadata, Wyeth does not stand for the proposition that a 
party never has to produce metadata.  Wyeth, decided before the effective 
date of the ESI Rules, involved the defendant’s request for all documents 
the plaintiffs had produced in previous patent litigation against another 
defendant.247  Referencing Williams, the court in Wyeth noted, “[m]ost 
metadata is of limited evidentiary value, and reviewing it can waste 
litigation resources.”248  The court recognized that if there were a showing  
 
 
 
                                                 
244
 Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 647. 
245
  Id. 
246
  Id. 
247
  Wyeth v. Impax Labs. Inc., No. Civ.A. 06-222-JJF, 2006 WL 3091331 (D. Del. Oct. 
26, 2006). 
248
  Id. at *2. 
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of particularized need, however, the court could order the production of 
metadata.249 
 
[92]  In Michigan First Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc., the court 
rejected the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions for the defendant’s failure to 
produce metadata for Lotus Notes e-mail messages, metadata involved the 
date and time of creation of the messages, “as well as a long string of 
characters that serves as a unique identifier for each message.”250  The 
defendant contended that the identifier would have no evidentiary value, 
and that the date and time of the creation of the message already appeared 
in the PDF copy produced.  The court agreed, but added, “[w]ere this not 
the case, there would be value in producing the metadata.”251  In other 
words, it was the type of metadata and the availability of the same 
information in other form that caused the court to reject sanctions for the 
failure to produce metadata.252 
 
[93]  The use of metadata to search ESI arose as issues in a number of 
cases in 2007.  In Scotts Co. LLC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the 
plaintiff asked that the defendant produce ESI, including metadata, in 
electronic form, instead of the hard copy form in which the defendant had 
produced the documents.253  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument 
that as a matter of law, a party’s discovery obligations are not satisfied by 
the production of computerized information in hard copy format.254  
However, the court quoted the Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 34 that 
if a “responding party ordinarily maintains the information it is producing 
                                                 
249
  Id.  For other court decisions ordering the production of metadata before the ESI 
Rules went into effect, see Rodriguez v. Fresno, No. 1:05cv1017 OWW DLB, 2006 WL 
903675 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2006); Hagenbuch v. 3B6 Eletronici Industriali, No. 04 C 
3109, 2006 WL 665005 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2006); Nova Measuring Instruments, Ltd. v. 
Nanometrics, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2006); CP Solutions PTE, Ltd. v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., No. 3:04cv2150(JBA)(WIG), 2006 WL 1272615 (D. Conn. Feb. 6, 
2006); In re Priceline.com Inc. Secs. Litig., 223 F.R.D. 88 (D. Conn. 2005). 
250
 Michigan First Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc., No. 05-74423, 2007 WL 
4098213, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2007). 
251
   Id.  
252
  The court also concluded, without explanation, that “the production of this metadata 
would be overly burdensome with no corresponding evidentiary value.”  Id. at *3. 
253
 Scotts Co. LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 WL 1723509 (S.D. 
Ohio June 12, 2007). 
254
 Id. at *4. 
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in a way that makes it searchable by electronic means, the information 
should not be produced in a form that removes or significantly degrades 
this feature.”255  The plaintiff argued that the documents were not 
reasonably usable, because they were not searchable.256  Since it was not 
clear that the parties had exhausted efforts to resolve the dispute, the court 
ordered the parties to confer and report back to the court.257  
 
[94]  In In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Discount, the 
plaintiffs had “rather laboriously stripped their text-searchable electronic 
documents of metadata that would not appear in printed form, and then 
converted them back into text searchable electronic documents without 
that subset of metadata.” 258  The court compelled the defendants, in the 
future, to produce the ESI, including metadata, in native format.259  The 
court said, as to prospective production, that the defendants “have run 
afoul of the Advisory Committee’s proviso that data ordinarily kept in 
electronically searchable form ‘should not be produced in a form that 
removes or significantly degrades this feature.’”260 
 
[95]  In John B. v. Goetz, the court ordered the defendants to provide 
complete responses to the discovery requests of the plaintiffs, and that 
these responses “shall include all metadata.”261  The court said that: 
 
[G]iven the need for hash coding of the ESI, Brent 
Antony’s limited formal computer training and the 
Defendants’ position about possible alteration of ESI, the 
                                                 
255
 Id. 
256
 The court specifically said the plaintiff argued that “some of the documents produced 
in hard copy form are not reasonably usable for the purpose for which they were 
requested since they cannot be searched for metadata.”  Id. 
257
 Id. 
258
 In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Discount, No. MD 05-1720(JG)(JO), 
2007 WL 121426, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2007).  It is not clear from the decision the 
content of the stripped metadata, so it is difficult to evaluate this decision. 
259
 Because “the Individual Plaintiffs provided a significant amount of discovery to the 
defendants, in several instalments, [sic] in the form they prefer, and heard no objection 
for several months,” the court did not grant the motion to compel the defendants to 
reproduce the documents/ESI they had already produced.  Id. at *4. 
260
 Id. 
261
 John B. v. Goetz, No. 3:98-0168, 2007 WL 3012808, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 
2007). 
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Plaintiff’s expert Thomas Tigh or his designee shall be 
present for the Defendants’ ESI production and provide 
such other services to the Defendants as are necessary to 
produce the metadata, as ordered by the Court.262   
 
Since this decision was based on a prior consent degree, however, it is not 
clear whether this decision should have any weight when there is no 
agreement between the parties or a final disposition of the case. 
 
B.  RAM AND OTHER EPHEMERAL DATA 
 
[96]  Rule 34(a) allows a party to obtain discovery of “electronically 
stored information – including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, 
photographs, sound recording, images, and other data or data compilations 
stored in any medium from which information can be obtained….”263  The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not define ESI.  The Committee notes 
state that the addition of “electronically stored information” to Rule 34 
“clarifies that Rule 34 applies to information that is fixed in a tangible 
form and to information that is stored in a medium from which it can be 
retrieved and examined.”264  In other words, ESI refers to information that 
a party can obtain from any storage medium and then examine – storage is 
distinct from obtaining/retrieving/examining the information. 
 
[97]  In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, the court held that “data stored 
in RAM, however temporarily, is electronically stored information subject 
to discovery under the circumstances of the instant case,” and denied the 
objection of the responding party to the earlier report and recommendation 
                                                 
262
 Id.  The Computer Dictionary Online defines “hash coding” in part as:  
A scheme for providing rapid access to data items which are 
distinguished by some key. Each data item to be stored is associated 
with a key, e.g. the name of a person. A hash function is applied to the 
item’s key and the resulting hash value is used as an index to select one 
of a number of “hash buckets” in a hash table. The table contains 
pointers to the original items.  
Computer-Dictionary-Online.org, Hash Coding, http://www.computer-dictionary-
online.org/?q=hash%20coding (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). 
263
 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (emphasis added). 
264
 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s note (emphasis added). 
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of the Magistrate Judge ordering the production of RAM.265  The plaintiffs 
had filed a complaint against the defendants for knowingly enabling, 
encouraging, inducing, and profiting from massive online piracy of the 
plaintiffs’ copyrighted works (movies and television programs) through 
the operation of their website.266  The defendants’ website offered users 
files for downloading that contained code enabling computers to access 
and copy copyrighted content without the permission of the copyright 
holder.267  In order to prove the defendants liable for contributory 
infringement, the plaintiffs had to prove that someone who the defendant 
had assisted directly infringed a copyrighted work in question.268  The 
plaintiffs sought Server Log Data that would show what files users were 
requesting, and the plaintiffs believed would establish that users were 
directly infringing the copyrighted files.269  
  
[98]  The court said that it was “undisputed that the Server Log Data 
Plaintiffs seek can be copied from RAM in Defendants’ computers and 
produced to Plaintiffs.”270  Although the defendants’ software had the 
capability of recording Server Log Data, the defendants had not turned on 
that function.  The court ordered the production of that Server Log Data 
under Rule 34.271 
                                                 
265
 Columbia Pictures Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007).  On 
December 13, 2007, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for terminating sanctions for 
willful/bad faith spoliation of evidence.  Id. 
266
 Id. at 445.  
267
 Id. 
268
 Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093 FMC(JCx), 2007 WL 4916963, 
at *19 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007).  
269
 Id. at *18.  
270
 Columbia Pictures, 245 F.R.D. at 447. 
271
 Id. at 448.  Since the defendant in Columbia Pictures had the software that, in the 
court’s mind, could easily record the data in question, the court concluded that producing 
the information in the future would not be a burden.  Therefore, the proportionality test of 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) did not prevent production.  The court noted that its order: 
 [S]imply requires that the defendants in this case, as part of this 
litigation, after the issuance of a court order, and following a careful 
evaluation of the burden to these defendants are preserving and 
producing the specific information requested in light of its relevance 
and the lack of other available means to obtain it, begin preserving and 
subsequently produce a particular subset of the data in RAM under 
defendant’s control.   
Id. at 448.  Interestingly, plaintiff had not submitted an interrogatory asking for the same 
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[99]  The court in Columbia Pictures relied, in large part, in making its 
decision that RAM was not too ephemeral to satisfy Rule 34 storage 
requirement, on the Ninth Circuit’s decision of MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak 
Computer, Inc.272  In MAI, the Ninth Circuit held copying of another 
party’s software onto RAM was sufficient to meet the statutory 
requirement for copyright infringement that the copy must be “fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression … sufficiently permanent or stable to 
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a 
period of more than transitory duration.”273 
 
[100]  The purpose of copyright law, however, is to give individuals the 
financial incentive to create literary and other works by giving those 
creators limited monopolies in the form of copyrights.274  The broader the 
definition of “copy,” the greater the financial incentive copyright law 
provides for the creation of the original works.  In other words, with a 
broad definition of copy, the author would have greater control over future 
production of similar works by third parties.  That aspect of copyright law 
supports a broad definition of what constitutes a copy of a work.  In 
contrast, under Rule 1, the inexpensive and speedy administration of 
justice, not the celebration of the profit motive, are the purposes of the 
Federal Rules.275  
 
[101]  The issue in MAI was whether a copy had been fixed.276  In 
Columbia Pictures, the issue should have been whether the information 
was “stored” (in “electronically stored information”).277  On that point, the 
common understanding of “to fix” is “to make firm or stable,”278 whereas 
the common understanding “to store” is “to stock or furnish against future 
time.”279  Since fix and store mean different things, and the purpose of 
                                                                                                                         
information requested in the Request for Production of Documents.  It is not clear what 
objections the defendant could have made if the request had been in the form of an 
interrogatory.   
272
 Id. at 447. 
273
 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computers, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing 17 
U.S.C. § 101).  
274
 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
275
 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
276
 MAI, 991 F.2d at 517. 
277
 Columbia Pictures Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007).  
278
 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 440 (10th ed. 1999). 
279
 Id. at 1159. 
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copyright law is different than the purpose of discovery in civil cases, the 
result in MAI should not have directed the result in Columbia Pictures. 
 
[102]  The court in Columbia Pictures made clear that it was not saying 
the defendant had violated any duty to preserve documents before the 
issuance of the order.280  However, if the court had the authority to order 
production of the information on RAM because the RAM constituted ESI, 
it could logically follow that the defendants have a duty to preserve that 
information to the extent it is relevant, at least from the time the litigation 
starts: 
 
When a “forensic image” is taken of a computer, that image 
only records data (bits) on the hard drive of the computer, 
not data on RAM.  In order to capture data on RAM, 
typically one “(1) saves the data to a hard drive or CD 
ROM, or (2) installs a ‘data dump program,’ which 
downloads the data on RAM at any particular time through 
the hard drive of the computer. 281 
 
In other words, a strong argument can be made that data is not retrieved 
and examined from RAM, but is retrieved and examined from hard drives 
and CD ROM’s. 
 
[103]  Although not directly on point, the reasoning of a 2005 Florida state 
court decision on RAM seems to contain better reasoning than the 
reasoning in Columbia Pictures.  In O’Brien v. O’Brien, an appeal of a 
divorce decision, the court addressed the use at trial of communications 
intercepted by the wife from the husband’s computer. 282  The wife had 
installed, without the knowledge of the husband, a spyware program on 
the husband’s computer that copied and stored electronic communications 
                                                 
280
 Columbia Pictures, 245 F.R.D. at 448 
281
 Douglas L. Rogers, Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell, 4-11 MEASLEY’S LITIG. REP. DISC. 
20 (2007).  See also CSO Security Counsel, Cybercrime, 
http://www.csoonline.com/counsel/session9/question806.html (last visited Feb. 11, 
2008); X-Ways Software Technology AG, X-Ways Capture: Successfully Seize All Hard 
Disks, Files, and RAM, http://www.winhex.com/capture/index-m.html (last visited Feb. 
11, 2008).  
282
 O’Brien v. O’Brien, 899 So.2d 1133 (Fla. App. 2005). 
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between the husband and another woman.283 That spyware program took 
snapshots of what appeared on the computer screen, allowing it to capture 
and record chat conversations, instant messages, and e-mails.284  The 
husband learned of the software, removed the software, and obtained a 
permanent injunction to prevent the wife’s disclosure of the intercepted 
communications in violation of the Florida equivalent of the Federal 
Wiretap Act.285  The wife appealed and argued that the communications 
were retrieved from storage, and therefore, were not intercepted 
communications in violation of the Florida Act.286 
 
[104]  The court in O’Brien rejected the wife’s argument that the 
communications were, in fact, stored once the text image became visible 
on the screen.287  The court reasoned: 
 
We do not believe that this evanescent time period is 
sufficient to transform acquisition of the communication 
from a contemporaneous interception to retrieval from 
electronic storage.  We conclude that because the spyware 
installed by the Wife intercepted the electronic 
communication contemporaneously with transmission, 
copied it, and routed the copy to a file on the computer’s 
hard drive, the electronic communications were intercepted 
in violation of the Florida Act.288  
 
[105]  In other words, the Florida court concluded that simply because 
information was displayed on a computer screen, and thus was on RAM, 
did not mean it was stored information.  Although O’Brien involved the 
Florida equivalent of the Wiretap Act, and not Rule 34, O’Brien draws a 
reasonable distinction between information on RAM and information 
stored on non-volatile memory. 
 
[106]  Before the ESI Rules, one federal court refused to order the 
production of similar ephemeral information.  In Convolve Inc. v.  
                                                 
283
 Id. at 1134. 
284
 Id. 
285
 Id. 
286
 Id. 
287
 Id. at 1137 
288
 Id. 
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Compaq Computer Corp., Convolve sued Compaq for patent infringement 
and trade secret misappropriation, and asked for sanctions for failing to 
print data displayed temporarily on the computer screen involving tests of 
an oscilloscope. 289  The court said that “the data at issue here are 
ephemeral.  They exist only until the tuning engineer makes the next 
adjustment, and then the document changes. No business purpose ever 
dictated that they be retained, even briefly.”290  Therefore, “absent the 
violation of a preservation order,” the court concluded that no sanctions 
were warranted.291  
 
[107]  Similarly, in a 2007 decision, Phillips v. Netblue, Inc., the 
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to 
preserve the images that would have been obtained by clicking on the 
hyperlinks in the e-mails retained by the plaintiff. 292  The court rejected 
the argument that the “plaintiff had the obligation to memorialize the e-
mails as they would have appeared if opened in an e-mail program soon 
after their receipt, i.e. with the images which the e-mail program would 
have displayed upon automatically accessing the remote web-server where 
those images resided.”293  The court concluded that this was not a failure to 
preserve evidence, but a failure to gather evidence, and the “law opposes 
                                                 
289
 Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computers Corp., 223 F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
290
 Id. at 177. 
291
 Id.  See also Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 427 F3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005).  Procter 
& Gable sued the defendants for trademark infringement.  The district court dismissed the 
claims of Proctor & Gamble for failing to comply with discovery orders, in particular 
market share computer data that the plaintiff had viewed on line but did not own or 
possess.  The Tenth Circuit said that:  
[T]he record indicates that the data was compiled, possessed, and 
owned by IRI, which in turn provided P&G with access to that data for 
a fee.  Although the IRI data in general could be deemed to have fallen 
within certain of defendants’ broadly-worded discovery requests, it is 
unclear precisely how P&G was to produce that data to defendants. 
 Id. at 739.  The court focused on a number of different ways Proctor & Gamble might 
have obtained that information and whether those ways would have been burdensome. 
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, but did not conclude that the data was not 
ESI.  Instead, it concluded that “the district court offered no explanation of what it meant 
by ‘relevant electronic data’ and what steps it believed P&G could and should have taken 
to preserve such data.”  Id. at 739-40. 
292
 Phillips v. Netblue, Inc., No. C-05-441 SC, 2007 WL 174459 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 
2007). 
293
 Id. at *2. 
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no obligation upon a party to gather evidence other than the requirement 
that a party have sufficient evidence to support their claim.”294  
 
C.  PRINCIPLES 
 
[108]  A party considering a request from opposing counsel to produce 
metadata needs to ask at least five questions.295  First, what type of 
metadata is the other party actually requesting, and has that party provided 
an explanation of the reason for the request?  Second, is the metadata 
relevant to claims or defenses in the case, including authentication of any 
documents/other ESI?  Third, even if the metadata is not relevant, does the 
requesting party have a good argument that the metadata will help it 
search the relevant ESI?  Fourth, if there is user-created metadata,296 how 
will any privileged material be redacted, identified, and preserved in case 
there is a subsequent challenge to the redaction?  Fifth, if the party 
produces metadata existing on a particular date, does it have to supplement 
that production later under Rule 26(e) as the metadata changes?  The 
answers to such questions will determine the response to the request, 
including any objections. 
 
[109]  A party considering a request to produce a database should ask 
similar questions to a request for metadata.  For instance, what 
information in the database is really relevant to the claims or defenses in 
the case?   If only parts of the database contain relevant non-privileged 
material, how can the relevant material be produced while sufficiently 
maintaining the usability of the database in order for the producing party 
to comply with Rule 34?  If the information in the database changes over 
time, is there a need to supplement? 
                                                 
294
 Id. at *3. 
295
 See, e.g., Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at Guideline 12, Comment 12.c. 
To the extent that the parties believe that production of metadata is 
needed because of either relevance or usability, that should be raised at 
this conference as it will be a consideration in determining both the 
need to preserve information in a particular form and the ultimate form 
or forms of production. . . . To the extent that the requesting party seeks 
a ‘native’ production or some other form of production with 
accompanying metadata, the revised rule places a burden on the party 
to make that request explicit.  
Id. 
296
  See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text. 
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[110]  The decision in Columbia Pictures that information on RAM 
constitutes ESI raises a number of issues, even though the specific facts in 
Columbia Pictures are not likely to occur in many future cases.297  In a 
future case in the jurisdiction of the Columbia Pictures court, does a party 
have to decide whether information on RAM is relevant and then tell 
opposing counsel the RAM is not reasonably accessible within the 
meaning of Rule 26(b)(2)(B),298 or risk waiving any objection to the 
production of information on RAM?  Would making such a statement 
unnecessarily “flag” an issue that opposing counsel might not otherwise 
raise?  Although this article argues that information on RAM is not ESI 
within the meaning of Rule 34, at least the Central District of California 
has concluded that “data stored in RAM, however temporarily, is 
electronically stored information . . . ,” so failing to make an early 
statement concerning not searching RAM could be risky.299 
 
[111]  One should not attempt to answer these questions in the abstract, 
however, but should address these questions as quickly as possible in the 
context of an actual dispute.  A party should probably approach opposing 
counsel and, if necessary, the court, to resolve disputes on these questions 
instead of having to fight a motion for sanctions months later.  Indeed, this 
suggested approach simply follows the requirement of Rule 26(f) that “the 
parties must confer, as soon as practicable . . . [to] discuss any issues about 
preserving discoverable information [] and develop a proposed discovery 
plan . . . [concerning] any issues about disclosure or discovery of 
electronically stored information, including the form or forms in which it 
should be produced.”300 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
297
 Rarely will server log data be as relevant as it was in Columbia Pictures.  Also, 
because the server had the software to record each request received for a file, except for 
volume, there would be no difficulty in turning on the server log function and recording 
each request, rather than trying to develop a program to perform the desired function.  
298
 See discussion infra Part V. 
299
 Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
300
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
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V. GOOD CAUSE FOR PRODUCTION OF NOT REASONABLY 
ACCESSIBLE ESI 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
[112]  The ESI Rules create a two-tier system of discovery.301  The 
presumption is that a party must produce relevant accessible ESI, but does 
not have to produce inaccessible ESI.302  
 
[113]  Under Rule 26(b)(2)(B), a party initially does not have to produce 
ESI containing relevant information that it “identifies as not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”303  After all, in contrast to 
searching accessible sources, searching for deleted documents in the 
unallocated space304 of a hard drive, or in the slack space305 of a hard 
                                                 
301
 Theodore C. Hirt, The Two-Tier Discovery Provision of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) - A 
Reasonable Measure for Controlling Electronic Discovery, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12 
(2007); Rosenthal, supra note 1; Withers, supra note 9, at *82-90. 
302
 This presumption about the production of relevant, accessible ESI is of course subject 
to the proportionality provisions of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). See supra Part III. 
303
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).  Only inaccessible ESI not being searched that contains 
potentially responsive information needs to be identified; a party does not have to 
identify all inaccessible ESI not being searched.  In addition to producing relevant, 
accessible ESI that is not privileged, “[t]he responding party must also identify, by 
category or type, the sources containing potentially responsive information that it is 
neither searching nor producing.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 234 F.R.D. 219, Committee Note 
(b)(2) (2006). See also infra  text accompanying note 307, at Guideline 2, Comment 2.c. 
(“Importantly, the Rules do not require the identification of all inaccessible sources of 
electronically stored information, but only those that the producing party believes in good 
faith may contain relevant, non-duplicative information.”). 
304
          Unallocated space is usually the result of a file being deleted.  When a file is 
deleted, it is not actually erased, but is simply no longer accessible 
through normal means [the directory or index of folders for the hard 
drive].  The space that it occupied becomes unallocated space. . . . Until 
portions of the unallocated space are used for new data storage, in most 
instances, the old data remains and can be retrieved using forensic 
techniques. 
Sedona Glossary, supra note 110, at 52. 
305
          The unused space on a cluster that exists when the logical file space is less than  
the physical file space. . . . A form of residual data, the amount of on-
disc file space from the end of the logical record information to the end 
of the physical disc record.  Slack space can contain information soft-
deleted from the record, information from prior records stored at the 
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drive, by itself, can be very time consuming and expensive.  If the other 
party files a motion to compel, then the resisting party has the burden of 
showing that the “information is not reasonably accessible because of 
undue burden or costs.”306  If the resisting party shows the information is 
not reasonably accessible, production may still be ordered if the requesting 
party shows “good cause,” considering the proportionality provisions in 
26(b)(2)(C).307  If the court finds good cause for production, it can still 
impose conditions on the production, including shifting costs for accessing 
and converting the ESI to a useable format.308  
 
[114]  There is no good cause for the production of inaccessible ESI if: (i) 
the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative; (ii)  the 
party seeking discovery has ample opportunity by discovery to obtain the 
information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.309  The Committee Notes state:  
 
Appropriate considerations may include:  (1) the specificity 
of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of information 
available from other and more easily accessed sources; (3) 
the failure to produce relevant information that seems likely 
to have existed but is no longer available on more easily 
accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding relevant, 
responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, 
more easily accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the 
importance and usefulness of the further information; (6) 
                                                                                                                         
same physical location as current records, metadata fragments, and 
other information useful for forensic analysis of computer systems. 
Id. at 48. 
306
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
307
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 234 F.R.D. 219, Amendments and Committee Note (2006). 
308
 Id.  For an early discussion of cost-shifting with respect to discovery of ESI, see 
Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and The Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561 
(2001).  In that article, Redish noted, “[b]ecause litigants do not bear the costs created by 
their discovery requests their incentive to confine those requests in a procedurally 
efficient manner is significantly distorted.”  Id. at 569. 
309
 For the complete text of the proportionality provisions of Rule 26(b)(2)(C), see text 
accompanying supra  note 146. 
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the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and 
(7) the parties’ resources.310   
 
[115]  The requesting party has the burden, in light of all of these factors, 
“of showing that its need for the discovery outweighs the burdens and 
costs of locating, retrieving and producing the information.”311  In other 
words, before finding good cause for the production of inaccessible 
information, a court must consider the seven factors, including the time it 
takes the producing party to review the ESI for responsiveness and 
privilege, and not simply the cost of collecting the ESI.  The possibility of 
shifting the cost of restoring ESI to an accessible format does not resolve 
the issue.312   
 
[116]  With this information as background, the next section examines 
how the courts in fact have responded under the ESI Rules to requests for 
the discovery of ESI in inaccessible format, or if in accessible format, 
information not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.313 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
310
 See Committee Notes, supra note 7 (emphasis added). These seven factors are an 
extension of the three proportionality factors. 
311
 See id.  
312
 The Committee Notes state, “A requesting party’s willingness to share or bear the 
access costs may be weighed by the court in determining whether there is good cause.  
But the producing party’s burden in reviewing the information for relevance and privilege 
may weigh against permitting the requested discovery.” Id.  Comment 13b to Sedona 
Principle 13 states: 
Shifting the costs of extraordinary electronically stored information 
discovery efforts should not be used as an alternative to sustaining a 
responding party’s objection to undertaking such efforts in the first 
place.  Instead, such efforts should only be required where the 
requesting party demonstrates substantial need or justification. The 
courts should discourage burdensome requests that have no reasonable 
prospect, given the size of the case, of significantly contributing to the 
discovery effort, even if the requesting party is wiling to pay. 
 The Sedona Principles, supra note 13, at 68, Principle 13. 
313
 Since December 1, 2006, some courts have responded without expressly referring to 
26(b)(2)(B). 
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B.  CASES DECIDED ON PRODUCTION OF INACCESSIBLE ESI 
 
1.  GOOD CAUSE 
 
A.  PRODUCTION DISCREPANCIES 
  
[117]  In a decision issued a few days before the effective date of the new 
ESI rules, the district court ordered the imaging of hard drives.314  
Although the court had previously rejected defendant’s motion, this time 
the court granted the motion, in part because: 
 
[S]erious questions exist both as to the reliability and the 
completeness of materials produced in discovery by 
Advante.  Among other things, there is evidence that copies 
of e-mails were altered at some point in time in a matter 
that arguably served to downplay or even conceal a 
relationship between Advante and James Liu, and the 
extent to which Liu may have worked with Advante to 
develop the products at issue in this action.315 
 
[118]  The court also granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel the imaging 
of the hard drive of the defendants in Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. 
Liberman, but said that “a party may not inspect the physical hard drives 
                                                 
314
 Advante Int’l. Corp. v. Mintel Learning Techs., No. C 05-01022 JW (RS), 2006 WL 
3371576 (N.D. Calif. Nov. 21, 2006).  Advante involved trade secret litigation. Id. at *2.  
The court ordered the parties to report back by December 1, 2006 on a protocol for the 
examination of the hard drive, and presumably the court was applying the ESI Rules. 
315
 Id. at *1.  The court rejected the argument of the defendant that production of the e-
mails in native format should be sufficient, concluding that “sufficient questions exist, 
not only with respect to these emails but also with respect to other discrepancies in 
Advante’s discovery responses, such that a forensic examination of Advante’s hard drives 
is warranted.”  Id.  The court ordered counsel for the parties to meet and confer on a 
protocol for the imaging and production of responsive documents, and added that 
“whatever documents or data may be recovered in the inspection, whether existing 
documents, recovered deleted documents, or other information, should all be produced 
first to counsel for Advante for its review as to relevance, responsiveness, and privilege, 
prior to any disclosure to Mintel or its counsel.”   Id. (citing Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Wells, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054-55 (S.D. Calif. 1999)).  In Playboy, referring to then 
Rule 26(b)(2), the court said, “The only restriction in this discovery is that the producing 
party be protected against undue burden and expense and/or invasion of privileged 
matters.” Playboy, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.  
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of a computer merely because the party wants to search for additional 
documents responsive to the party’s document requests.”316  The court 
added that “discrepancies or inconsistencies in the responding party’s 
discovery responses may justify a party’s request to allow an expert to 
create and examine a mirror image of the hard drive.”317  However, the 
specific good cause the court found for ordering the imaging of the hard 
drive of the defendants was that the plaintiff provided to the court a 
relevant e-mail sent by the defendant to a third party that the defendant 
had not produced.  The court concluded that other deleted or active 
versions of e-mails might exist on the defendant’s computers, so the court 
ordered the search.318  The plaintiff did “not object to incurring … the 
costs involved in creating the mirror images, recovering the information, 
and translating the information into searchable formats,” so the court said 
plaintiff would incur those costs.319  However, the court did not indicate 
whether the defendant had objected to the time it would take to review the 
restored material for responsiveness and privilege.  In fact, restoring ESI 
to an accessible format can cost less than the cost of reviewing that 
restored ESI for responsiveness and privilege. 
 
[119]  In Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington v. Washington 
Metro. Transit Auth., the court ordered the defendants to search backup 
tapes as a result of their failure to turn off automatic delete procedures in 
their computer system. 320  The court noted that “the request is for the e-
mails of specific persons, and there is absolutely no other source from 
                                                 
316
 Ameriwood Indus. Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 WL 3825291 at *4 
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2006) (citing McCurdy Group v. Am. Biomedical Group, Inc., 9 Fed. 
Appx. 822, 831 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
317
 Id. at *4 (citing Simon Property Group LP v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 641 
(S.D. Ind. 2000)) (emphasis added). 
318
 Id. at *3.  The court also suggested a type of case in which there may be good cause 
for searching a hard drive:  “cases where defendant allegedly used the computer itself to 
commit the wrong that is the subject of the lawsuit. …” Id. at *4.  The Court then set 
forth a procedure for imaging the hard drive, which included the plaintiffs selecting an 
expert of its choice to go to the defendants’ places of business and take forensic images.  
No employee of the plaintiff, or its counsel, would inspect or otherwise handle the 
equipment or information produced.  The expert would then provide the recovered 
documents to the defendants’ counsel, with a notice to the plaintiff.  See id. at *5 and *6. 
319
 Id. at *5. 
320
 Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington v. Washington Metro. Transit Auth., 
242 F.R.D. 139, 148 (D.D.C.  2007). 
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which electronically stored information can be secured, thanks to 
WMATA’s failure to impose the litigation hold.”321  Moreover, “WMATA 
[did] not defend its failure to prevent the automatic feature from operating 
during the course of this litigation,” when it had an obligation to preserve 
documents.322 
 
[120]  The court ordered the defendants to restore at their cost a portion of 
their inaccessible backup tapes in AAB Joint Ventures v. United States, 
which was a dispute over construction contracts.323   The plaintiffs 
asserted that the defendant had identified numerous individuals who were 
participants in the project, but did not produce their e-mail.  The court 
noted that the defendant countered that it had produced thousands of 
electronic documents, but had conceded it was unable to locate e-mails of 
some of the individuals who presumably generated e-mails within the 
scope of the documents requested by the plaintiff.  The court said it could 
not “relieve defendant of its duty to produce those documents merely 
because defendant had chosen a means to preserve the evidence [referring 
to backup tapes] which makes ultimate production of relevant documents 
expensive.”324  
 
B.  OTHER REASONS 
 
[121]  Medical claims files in electronic, but essentially unsearchable, 
format were the documents the court ordered the defendant to produce in 
W.E. Aubuchon Co., Inc. v. Benefirst, LLC.325  Once they were processed 
for payment, the requested claims forms were retained for a 60 day period.  
Batches of these claims forms were scanned and stored as electronic 
                                                 
321
 Id.  The court also said that the plaintiffs had no substantial resources and that the law 
firm representing them was proceeding pro bono, and noted that the fact “persons who 
suffer from physical disabilities have equal transportation resources to work and to enjoy 
their lives with their fellow citizens is a crucial concern of this community.”  Id.   
322
 Id. at *146. 
323
 AAB Joint Ventures v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432 (2007).  Without expressly 
discussing Rule 26(b)(2), the court said that from the results of that sample, the court 
would determine whether additional restoration of backup tapes would likely lead to the 
production of relevant evidence.  Id. at *443-44.   
324
 Id. at *440.  Similarly, the court later said that “defendant’s decision to transfer the e-
mails to backup tapes does not exempt defendant from its responsibility to produce 
relevant emails.”  Id. at *443. 
325
 W.E. Aubuchon Co., Inc. v. Benefirst, LLC, 245 F.R.D. 38 (D. Mass. 2007). 
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images (in groups according to when they were processed and the person 
who processed the claims).  The original forms were then destroyed.  
 
[122]  The issues the judge considered in his February 6, 2007 decision in 
Aubuchon were whether the information was reasonably accessible, and if 
it was not, should it be produced.  The court agreed that a media-based 
approach to considering accessibility was reasonable and concluded that 
since the images were stored on a server, they were in an accessible 
format.  However, the court continued that to in fact be accessible, the ESI 
must be readily usable once it is obtained, whereas inaccessible data has to 
be “restored or otherwise manipulated to be usable,” citing Zubulake.326  
Since the information was stored in images, and only indexed in load files 
by processing date and the person who processed the claim, the court 
concluded that “the retrieval of the records will be costly and…. such 
retrieval would involve undue burden or cost.”327  In other words, even 
though the ESI was in an accessible format, the court concluded the ESI 
was not reasonably accessible due to undue burden or cost. 
 
[123]  The court in Aubuchon then turned to the issue of good cause for 
production and considered the seven points discussed in the Committee 
Notes.328  It noted that the digital images were not available through any 
other source, and that the information was crucial to the outcome of the 
litigation.  There was no discussion of when the duty to preserve attached, 
perhaps because of the statement that “although in the custody and control 
of Benefirst, the records at issue are the property of the plaintiffs.”329  The 
court also relied on the fact that the plaintiffs had significantly narrowed 
their original request from approximately 34,000 claims to 3,000 claims, 
and ordered the defendant to produce the approximately 3,000 claims at 
the defendant’s expense.330 
 
[124]  The court granted the plaintiff’s motion to have a digital image 
made of the hard drives in Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, a case alleging that the 
defendants improperly used confidential information and trade secrets to 
                                                 
326
 Id. at 42.   
327
 Id. at 43. 
328
 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
329
 Id. at 44. 
330
 Id. at 45. 
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divert business from the plaintiff to the defendants.331 The court said the 
issue: 
 
[R]equires a weighing of defendants’ burden in producing 
the information sought against plaintiff’s interest in access 
to that information.  Because of the close relationship 
between plaintiff’s claims and defendants’ computer 
equipment, the Court will allow plaintiff to select an expert 
to oversee the imaging of all the defendants’ computer 
equipment.332   
 
Presumably the reference to “close relationship” referred to the fact that 
the plaintiff thought the defendants’ computers contained the proprietary 
information of the plaintiff.  However, there was no discussion in the 
decision about the basis for that belief, whether e-mails had been 
previously produced, and if so, what the e-mails or other earlier 
production had disclosed. 
 
[125]  The court ordered the forensic examination of the hard drive of the 
plaintiff’s computer in Thielend v. Juan Boungiorno USA, Inc.,333 in which 
the plaintiff had sued the defendant for sending text messages to plaintiff’s 
cell phone without the plaintiff’s permission.  The court said: 
 
Unlike the not so distant past, when individual file folders 
pertaining to specific subjects could be readily identified 
and removed from a file drawer for inspection without 
disclosing the rest of the contents of the file cabinet to the 
opposing side, inspection of an opponent’s computer may 
open up countless files to the searcher that are not relevant 
and that may be proprietary or privileged.334   
 
The court concluded that the defendant had established “a viable reason” 
for the discovery, in particular whether the plaintiff had used his computer 
                                                 
331
 Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, No. 06-CV-2623, 2007 WL 442387 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2007). 
332
 Id. at *2. 
333
 Thielend v. Juan Boungiorno USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-16, 2007 WL 465680 (W.D. 
Mich. Feb. 8, 2007). 
334
 Id. at *2. 
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to initiate contact with the defendant, an issue relevant to whether the 
plaintiff had received unsolicited communications from the defendant.335 
 
[126]  The court in Thieland, however, said that to allow the defendant 
unrestricted access to the plaintiff’s computer would constitute an undue 
burden, not due to cost, but due to the defendant’s access to proprietary 
and privileged information of the plaintiff.336  The court ordered the 
defendant, through an expert, to conduct the forensic examination of the 
plaintiff’s computer and to limit its examination of the forensic image to 
determining whether from December 1 through December 15 of 2005, the 
plaintiff accessed the defendant’s website, and what, if any, information 
about those transactions had been deleted.337  
 
[127]  In In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation,338 a 
shareholders’ derivative action against the board of directors for breach of 
fiduciary duty,339 the court concluded that plaintiff had demonstrated good 
cause to order defendants to restore backup tapes pursuant to Rule 
26(b)(2)(C).  The court explained: 
 
[E]-mails sent or received by defendants relating to the 
issues herein could constitute important relevant evidence 
and are reasonably calculated to lead to admissible 
evidence.  It has not been demonstrated that said 
information is reasonably available from any other easily 
                                                 
335
 Id. 
336
 “Cost to plaintiff is not a factor.  It appears there would be little out-of-pocket expense 
to plaintiff if the defendant was to take an image of the hard drive of his computer.”  Id. 
at *2, n. 3. 
337
 Id. at *3.  The defendant was ordered to select an experienced forensic examiner to 
conduct the investigation and to conduct the investigation outside of the presence of the 
parties or their attorneys.  The expert was to provide a hard copy of the proposed findings 
to the plaintiff’s counsel for review prior to furnishing them to the defendant’s counsel.  
Id. 
338
 In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 05 MD 1695(CM)(GAY), 
2007 WL 983987 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007). 
339
 See In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation, 434 F. Supp. 2d 267 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
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accessed source.  The discovery requests are specific.  The 
resources of the parties are not an issue.340   
 
There was no explanation in the decision of why the court concluded 
resources were not an issue, no discussion of when the duty to preserve 
documents attached, and no discussion of why the court appeared to put 
the burden on the objecting party to prove that the requested information 
was reasonably available from accessible sources. 
 
2.  NO GOOD CAUSE 
 
[128]  In Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Topeka the court rejected the 
plaintiff’s motion to compel restoration and searching of the defendant’s 
backup tapes.341  The litigation involved the City of Topeka’s decision to 
deny a request for conditional use permits.  Defendant Topeka had 
deleted, in June of 2005, the electronic communications that formed the 
basis of the discovery dispute, but the defendant received notice of the 
likelihood of litigation on August 12, 2005.  The court said that “there is 
no evidence on the record to indicate that at the time of the receipt of the 
demand letter the backup tapes on the server system contained allegedly 
deleted e-mails from June, 2005.”342  The court added that even if such 
backup tapes had been shown to possess deleted e-mail communications, 
litigation holds generally did not apply to inaccessible backup tapes, and 
such tapes could “continue to be recycled on the schedule set forth in the 
company’s policy.”343 
 
[129]  The court in Oxford House then considered whether searching the 
backup tapes would be unduly burdensome.  The court said that the mere 
fact that compliance would cause great labor and expense or considerable 
                                                 
340
 In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 05 MD 1695(CM)(GAY), 
2007 WL 983987 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007).  The court declined to rule on any cost 
shifting until the defendant had produced electronic discovery at its own expense and 
then submitted an affidavit detailing the results of its search and the time and money 
spent.  
341
 Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Topeka, No. 06-4004-RDR, 2007 WL 1246200 (D. Kan. 
Apr. 27, 2007). 
342
 Id. at *3. 
343
 Id. at *4 (Quoting Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 217). 
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hardship did not, in itself, require denial of the motion.344  Instead, there 
should be a cost-benefit analysis investigating the marginal utility of 
additional production versus the cost.345  The court denied the motion to 
compel because “the likelihood of retrieving these electronic 
communications is low and the cost high.”346 
 
[130]  Also, in Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. Liberman,347 the court did 
not find good cause to order the production of e-mails and Microsoft 
Office files.  Ameriwood claimed that the defendants, former employees 
of Ameriwood, had formed a company and improperly used confidential 
information taken from Ameriwood.  The defendants moved to compel the 
production of ESI that included 52,124 potentially responsive e-mails and 
4,413 additional computer files, such as Microsoft Office files.  The court 
held that “the information is not reasonably accessible because the request 
is unduly burdensome, and turns to defendants for a showing of good 
cause.”348  In other words, although in an accessible format, the court 
found that the e-mails were not reasonably accessible due to undue 
burden, presumably not because collecting the e-mails and Microsoft files 
would be burdensome, but because reviewing them for responsiveness and 
privilege would have taken a lot of time and effort by attorneys.   
 
[131]  The court in this Ameriwood decision considered the question of 
good cause and the factors identified by the Committee Notes.  The court 
concluded that the defendants’ request was not narrowly tailored to seek 
only information relevant to the affirmative defense that the plaintiff’s lost 
sales were due to the plaintiff’s mismanagement, and did not discuss any 
of the other six factors in the Committee Notes.349  The court added that 
the “defendants have failed to show good cause to order disclosure of the 
                                                 
344
 Id. (quoting Snowden v. Cannaught Lab., Inc., 137 F.R.D. 325, 332-333 (D. Kan. 
1991)). 
345
 Id.  
346
 Id. at *5 
347
 Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2007 WL 496716 
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2007).  This decision ruled on a motion to compel by the defendant, 
whereas the earlier Ameriwood decision, No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 WL 3825291 (E.D. 
Mo. Dec. 27, 2006), text accompanying supra notes 316-19, involved a motion to compel 
by the plaintiff. 
348
 Id. at *2. 
349
 Id. 
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communications and documents, even if the court were to limit the request 
of the documents involving the six aforementioned employees.”350   
 
[132]  In Calyon v. Mizuho Securities USA, Inc., the court tentatively 
denied the plaintiff’s motion to have direct, complete access to the 
defendant’s hard drives to show that the defendants had transmitted the 
proprietary business information of the plaintiff through the defendant’s 
computers.351  The court noted that the plaintiff had not argued that (1) the 
individual defendants had failed to produce all responsive documents, (2) 
there were discrepancies or inconsistencies in defendant’s responses to 
previous discovery requests, or (3) relevant documents or data had been 
lost.352  The court rejected the plaintiff’s motion to compel, but ordered the 
defendants to preserve mirror images of the hard drives and other storage 
devices at issue.353  
 
[133]  In Scotts Company LLC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the court 
rejected the plaintiff’s request to require the defendant to allow a forensic 
expert to search the defendant’s computer system, network service and 
databases and to require the defendant to provide backup tapes of certain 
information systems.354  The court noted that imaging of computer hard 
drives was an expensive process, because “an examination of a hard drive 
by an expert automatically triggers the retention of an expert by the 
                                                 
350
 Id. 
351
 Calyon v. Mizuho Sec. USA, Inc., No. 07CIV02241RODF, 2007 WL 1468889, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2007).  The plaintiff and the individual defendants reached an 
agreement to preserve the hard drives of the personal computers and the computer storage 
devices of the individual defendants by creating mirrored images, but the parties had not 
agreed on a protocol for reviewing the mirror images.  The plaintiff alleged that former 
employees, the defendants, had conspired to transmit the plaintiff’s proprietary business 
information to the other defendant. Id. at *1. 
352
 Id. at *5. 
353
          If, after the Individual Defendants’ production of documents and data 
from those mirror images, Calyon can demonstrate that relevant and 
responsive information has been withheld or is missing, or that the 
Individual Defendants’ expert has failed to consult fully, in good faith, 
with Calyon’s expert in order to develop an appropriate search 
protocol, then Calyon may renew its application for direct access to the 
mirror images.  
Id. at *6. 
354
 Scotts Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 WL 1723509, at *1, *3 
(S.D. Ohio June 12, 2007). 
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responding party for the same purpose.”355  The court also noted that 
imaging a hard drive resulted in the production of “massive amounts of 
irrelevant, and perhaps privileged information.”356  The court said it was 
“loath to sanction intrusive examination of an opponent’s computer as a 
matter of course, or on the mere suspicion that the opponent may be 
withholding discoverable information.”357  
 
[134]  In Pipefitters Local No. 636 Pension Fund v. Mercer Human 
Resources Consulting, Inc., the district court vacated the report and 
recommendation of the magistrate judge that the plaintiffs would bear the 
cost of restoring or locating electronic data, if the defendants requested 
such data. 358  The court said, “[d]ue to the lack of a record it is not 
apparent that the Magistrate Judge engaged in the proper analysis before 
shifting the cost of discovery to plaintiffs.”359 
 
C.  PRINCIPLES 
 
[135]  The issue of whether there is good cause to require a party to search 
for inaccessible ESI should focus on the conduct of that party, as the 
courts did:  (1) in ordering searches of inaccessible data in Advante, 
Ameriwood (2006), Disability Rights and AAB; and (2) in rejecting a 
motion to search inaccessible ESI in Calyon and Scotts.  As the court held 
in Disability Rights, good cause to order the search of inaccessible ESI 
clearly arises when the requesting party shows that the producing party 
allowed the destruction of ESI in accessible format when it had an 
obligation to preserve documents.360  Under Advante, good cause to order 
the search of inaccessible ESI clearly arises when there has been alteration 
of documents or ESI produced. 361  Also, if a party fails to produce many 
relevant e-mails that clearly existed at a time when that party had an 
                                                 
355
 Id. at *2. 
356
 Id. 
357
 Id. 
358
 Pipefitters Local No. 636 Pension Fund v. Mercer Human Res. Consulting, Inc., No. 
05-CV-74326, 2007 WL 2080365, at *1, *3 (E.D. Mich.  July 19, 2007). 
359
 Id. at *2. 
360
 Disability Rights Council of Greater Washington v. Washington Metropolitan Transit 
Authority, 242 F.R.D. 139, 147-48 (D.D.C. 2007). 
361
 Advante Int’l Corp., v. Mintel Learning Tech., No. C. 05-01022 JW (RS), 2006 WL 
3371576, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2006). 
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obligation to preserve documents, as appeared to be the case in AAB, that 
would also appear to justify an initial finding of “good cause” to search for 
ESI in inaccessible format.362  
 
[136]  To conclude, however, that there is good cause because a defendant 
failed to produce one e-mail it had sent to a third party, as the court 
apparently did  in the 2006 Ameriwood decision, seems to be a very low 
standard. 363 It could be the reason the producing party did not retain the e-
mail is that the producing party had a different, and perfectly reasonable, 
document retention policy than the third party receiving the e-mail.  There 
would not necessarily be any indication that the producing party had failed 
to comply with any of its obligations, so there would not necessarily 
appear to be good cause to impose the burden of searching for, and then 
reviewing for responsiveness and privilege, inaccessible information.   
 
[137]  Rule 26(b)(2)(B) says the requesting party must show good cause, 
“considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”364 Rule 26(b)(2)(B) does 
not say “good cause” equals the limitations in 26(b)(2)(C) or the factors in 
the Committee Notes.   
 
[138]  Failing to put primary weight on the conduct of the party who has 
the ESI, or only considering (a) the three proportionality factors in 
26(b)(2)(C), incorporated into 26(b)(2)(B), and (b) the related seven 
factors listed in the Committee Notes, would let the tail wag the dog.  If 
the party with the ESI has complied with all of its obligations to preserve 
documents/ESI and produce accessible ESI, then generally there should 
not be good cause to order the search of inaccessible ESI.  At least in the 
case of the producing party having complied with all of its legal 
obligations, the marginal utility of the ESI sought should be much greater 
to warrant an order requiring a search of inaccessible ESI than if the party 
has not complied with all its obligations. 
 
[139]  Why should there be a finding of good cause simply because the 
requesting party alleges that the producing party used the computers in 
                                                 
362
 AAB Joint Venture v. U.S., 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 440 (Fed. Cl. 2007). 
363
 Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 WL 3825291, at *1 
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2006).  See supra text accompanying notes 316-19. 
364
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIV, Issue 3 
 
81 
question to commit tortuous acts?  Although the court in Cenveo found the 
allegation of such conduct in the complaint good cause, the decision in 
Scotts rejecting a per se rule appears more sound. 365  At a minimum, a 
requesting party should have to show that it requested accessible e-mails, 
and then show that what was produced as a result of that request supports 
a finding of good cause.366  The burden is on the requesting party to show 
good cause. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
[140]  Parties to litigation should not be hesitant to fight for reasonable 
restrictions on preservation and production.  The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure allow for – and the intent behind them indeed call for - more 
restraints on discovery than many courts and parties recognize. 
 
[141]  On the other hand, a responding party wanting to narrow overly 
broad preservation demands or discovery requests should understand that 
unilateral imposition of what seems to that party to be reasonable 
preservation and production decisions can significantly increase the risks 
for that responding party and its attorneys, because the law is unclear in 
these areas.  What is clear is that the ESI Rules tie the tools for restraints 
on discovery to increased disclosure between the opposing parties and 
increased judicial supervision of discovery.367  Parties to litigation proceed 
at their own risk if they disregard either branch of the “bargain:” (1) tools 
to enforce balanced preservation/discovery and (2) greater transparency in 
preservation/discovery.   
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 Cenveo Corp. v. Slater, No. 06-CV-2632, 2007 WL 442387, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 
2007); Scotts Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., No. 2:06-CV-899, 2007 WL 1723509, at *2 
(S.D. Ohio June 12, 2007). 
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          More easily accessed sources—whether computer-based, paper, or  
human – may yield all the information that is reasonably useful for the 
action.  Lawyers sophisticated in these problems are developing the 
two-tier practice in which they first sort through the information that 
can be provided from easily accessed sources and then determine 
whether it is necessary to search the difficult-to-access sources.   
Court Rules, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 234 F.R.D. 219, 331 (2006). 
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 See, e.g., Robert Douglas Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy E-
Discovery Seas, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 53 (2004); Paul & Baron, supra note 1. 
